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ABSTRACT 
 
In the antebellum American South, slaves and free blacks from across the Atlantic World 
went to court to petition for their freedom from illegal enslavement. US legal officials primarily 
cared whether or not slaves could prove their free status in court and, to that end, petitioners made 
legal claims that reflected themselves and their identities as free persons. They emphasized to 
courts that they were born free, emancipated or manumitted, and had freedom papers. To support 
these claims, petitioners also created narratives that would represent their identities as free 
persons and common examples included telling legal officials that they previously moved freely 
in the Atlantic, served in the military, or worked in skilled labor positions. Another way that 
petitioners articulated their status and identity as free persons was by telling legal officials about 
their connections to Atlantic empires. To petitioners, being a member of Iberian, French, or 
British empires and enjoying imperial subjecthood was closely connected to their identities as 
free persons.  
This thesis examines freedom suits in the antebellum US South by slaves and free blacks 
from across the Atlantic World and the ways they created legal narratives connected to their 
identities within nineteenth-century empires. Ultimately, legal officials were most concerned 
with whether or not petitioners could prove their free status - not where they belonged in the 
Atlantic World, to what empires they pledged loyalty, or what king recognized them as subjects. 
Therefore, petitioners created narratives centered around proving their freedom. However, slaves 
and free blacks continued to incorporate notions of Atlantic empires and subjecthood in their 
freedom petitions to varying degrees - even if it served little legal strategical purpose to a US 
court. Their narratives illuminate the importance that imperial belonging and subjecthood 
represented to slaves and free blacks from the Atlantic World petitioning for freedom in the US 
vii 
 
South and demonstrate that they understood imperial belonging and subjecthood as a way to 
embody their identities and experiences as free persons. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"FALSE AND PRETENDED MASTERS:" BELONGING, EMPIRE, AND SUBJECTHOOD 
IN FREEDOM-CLAIMING IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC WORLD" 
In December 1815, John Lewis, a black man, petitioned for his freedom at the First District 
Court of New Orleans in Louisiana.1 Lewis told the court that he was "born in the island of Jamaica 
of free parents" and that he "always enjoyed his freedom until he was forcibly and unlawfully 
seized in the state of Kentucky." According to Lewis, he previously worked "in the capacity of a 
sailor onboard the Morning Star" that traveled to South Carolina in 1811 "from Dundee in Scotland 
in the Kingdom of Great Britain." Upon arriving in the United States, he told legal officials that 
he was "seduced into the state of Kentucky," "there seized and transported" and "shipped from 
thence and sold as a slave" to be "held in bondage by a certain Harvey Norton...contrary to...his 
lawful rights." 
A few years later in June 1819, Candido Gomez presented the New Orleans district court with 
a similar freedom suit.2 According to his testimony, Gomez was "born free and raised a free man 
in St. Salvador in the Kingdom of Brazil.” He stated that he was working as a “seaman onboard 
the Brig Falcon” on its way from Salvador, Brazil, to Havana, Cuba, in 1811. According to Gomez, 
though, the ship never arrived. Instead, he stated that French privateers on a corsair captained by 
                                                             
1 Petition of John Lewis to the First District Court of the State of Louisiana Court at Orleans Parish, Louisiana, 
6 December 1815, New Orleans Public Library, New Orleans, Louisiana; Granted; in Race and Slavery Petitions 
Project, Series II: County Court Petitions (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), Microfilm 
edition, Petition Analysis Record No. 20881522.  
 
2 Petition of Candido Gomez to the First District Court of the State of Louisiana Court at Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana, 10 February 1818, Supreme Court of Louisiana Collection, University of New Orleans; Granted; Retried; 
Denied; Rescinded; Dismissed; Appealed; Affirmed; in Race and Slavery Petitions Project, Series II: County Court 
Petitions (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), Microfilm edition, Petition Analysis Record No. 
20881876. 
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famous French pirate, Jean Lafitte, “illegally captured” their vessel and took them to Grande Terre, 
a traditional pirate den in the Lesser Antilles. Held as prisoners by the French in the Caribbean, 
Gomez stated that he was later brought to New Orleans by a member of the corsair, Alexander 
Bonlivar.3 He claimed that Bonlivar detained him, continued to hold him in bondage as his 
personal slave, and “pretended to the right to sell” him. “Praying that his status as a free man be 
recognized and that he be granted his freedom,” Gomez asked the court that he “may be allowed 
to sue for his freedom” and that Bonlivar be “summoned to pay the costs of the suit.”  
Nearly two decades later and in a rural, plantation parish outside of New Orleans, Marie 
Francoise, a black woman, presented the district court in Iberville Parish, Louisiana with yet 
another similar legal suit as she petitioned for the freedom of her sons in 1845.4 She explained to 
legal officials that her children were wrongfully held as slaves by the Borie family, a powerful 
free-black and slaveholding family in Louisiana. Marie Francoise explained that she and her 
children had long worked on the plantation as free persons and that her late mother, Isabelle, was 
a free woman from French Saint-Domingue who once had a close relationship with the Borie 
family's matriarch, Valerie Belly.5 According to Marie Francoise, in Saint-Domingue Isabelle and 
Valerie had lived as free persons and later, during the Haitian Revolution, fled together to Cuba. 
After spending years in "Au Cane" in Santiago, Cuba as French refugees, Isabelle and Valerie 
                                                             
3 Spelling of 'Bonlivar' unclear and inconsistent in petition. Could also be French 'Boulivar.'  
 
4 Petition of Marie Francoise to the District Court, Iberville Parish, Louisiana, 12, June 1845, in Records of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Marie Francoise v. Cyrpien Ricard, George Delonde Jr., and Pauline Ricard, 
document/case #2279, PCH-Iberville Parish, Plaquemine, Louisiana. Petition Analysis Record No. 20884517.  
 
5 Valerie Belly has a few iterations of her name in the document. Her maiden name in Saint-Domingue was 
Valerie Samanos and then Belly in Louisiana. In Iberville, she married Augustin Borie and became known also as 
Madam Borie. 
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"were compelled to quit the island in the year 1809 as French subjects" as a result of war between 
Spain and France and they relocated to New Orleans as free women.6  
Decades later both Isabelle and Valerie had died and Marie Francoise faced new challenges to 
her and her family's freedom because of an error in Valerie's will. According to Marie Francoise, 
Valerie falsely claimed her as one of her slaves in the will and freed her. Likely surprised at this 
discovery, Marie Francoise was considered then a freed, former slave and, therefore, her children 
were also slaves. Marie Francoise asked the court to recognize her and her children's freedom 
derived from her mother's free ancestry in French Saint-Domingue, demanded reparations, and 
concluded that "the false and pretended masters cannot allege the prescription against their 
freedom.” 
At first, John Lewis, Candido Gomez, and Marie Francoise's petitions may seem distinct. After 
all, they each told the courts about their lived experiences from different corners of the Atlantic 
World and each petitioner came from a separate imperial and colonial jurisdiction in the Caribbean. 
Lewis told the court that he was "born free" in British Jamaica and discussed his life as a free black 
sailor in "the Kingdom of Great Britain." Gomez brought an Iberian perspective to his petition and 
stated that he was "born free and raised free" in Brazil. Finally, Marie Francoise recalled her links 
to the French Caribbean and referenced her family's long history as free persons in Saint-
Domingue.  
Although they came from different British, Iberian, and French jurisdictions in the Atlantic 
World, Lewis, Gomez, and Marie Francoise's petitions have much in common. For instance, they 
each had important experiences moving across the Atlantic. Lewis and Gomez described to legal 
officials their experiences as free black sailors and Marie Francoise explained her family's 
                                                             
6 In 1809, Spain ordered the expulsion of all French subjects from their territory as they entered war with 
Napoleon-led France.  
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displacement across the Caribbean in the wake of war and revolution. Indeed, they all traveled far 
and wide from their original homes in Jamaica, Brazil, and Saint-Domingue.  
The petitioners also shared similar experiences under illicit and illegal slavery in the Atlantic 
World. John Lewis described being kidnapped in Kentucky, Gomez by French pirates in the 
Caribbean, and Marie Francoise's children were enslaved by a family she knew. Further, each 
petitioner sought to regain their freedom in the law and used legal institutions like local courts in 
the antebellum South to seek recourse to their illegal enslavement. Taken together, these freedom 
petitions represent larger and interconnected histories of Atlantic movement, illicit slavery, and 
freedom-claiming in law, and, importantly, should be viewed in tandem. 
In examining the petitions together, patterns emerge in their testimonies and reveal shared 
narrative strategies that petitioners used to best frame their freedom suits. Legal officials in US 
courts were most concerned with whether the petitioners could prove their free status. Therefore, 
at the crux of all their petitions were litigants' assertions and testimonies that they were free. 
Petitioners highlighted to courts that they were born free, manumitted or emancipated, or lived as 
free persons from their respective jurisdictions.  
They also told courts stories about their lived experiences to support their legal claims and to 
represent their identities as free persons. Gomez and Lewis emphasized in their testimonies that 
their claims to freedom could be seen in connection to their free labor and movement as black 
sailors in the Atlantic. Likewise, John Lewis and Marie Francoise created kinship narratives that 
grounded their claims for liberty on free ancestry and described their relationships to free parents. 
Further, Lewis and Marie Francoise also stressed their experiences moving freely throughout the 
Caribbean and, especially, the recognition of those rights across jurisdictions as they crossed 
borders.  
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In addition to telling courts that they were free and creating narratives that reflected their 
experiences and identities as free persons, petitioners also included information about where they 
came from in the Atlantic. John Lewis stated that he was "born in the island of Jamaica of free 
parents" and traveled across the "Kingdom of Great Britain." Likewise, Gomez told officials that 
he was "born free and raised free in the Kingdom of Brazil." Finally, Marie Francoise connected 
herself to her mother's experiences in Saint-Domingue and Cuba as a "French subject."  
Interesting imperial notions marked the petitioners' statements on where they were from in the 
Atlantic World. Lewis and Gomez invoked the ideas of sovereign kingdoms in the Atlantic such 
as that of Great Britain and of Brazil in stating where they were from. Likewise, Marie Francoise 
connected her claims to an inherited imperial subjecthood. As they told the courts where they were 
from in the Atlantic, it seems that they connected their identities as free persons to empires, 
sovereign powers, and black imperial subjecthood. 
Petitioners' use of imperial language to articulate their identities as free persons in connection 
to their legal claims for freedom suggest that empire and subjecthood occupied an important role 
in slavery, freedom, and law in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World. It also raises many 
questions about Atlantic imperial authority, narrative and performance, and law and legal culture. 
For one, what role did the language of empire and subjecthood play in freedom-claiming legal 
narratives? To petitioners, articulating to what empire they belonged and claimed subjecthood was 
important to tell legal officials. However, what significance did it hold in their narratives? Was it 
simply a way for petitioners to state where they were from? Or, did they envision their membership 
in an empire as closely connected to their legal claims for freedom? In other words, did petitioners 
consider the use of imperial language and subjecthood a legal strategy that would support their 
claims or just basic information to relate to legal officials? 
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If petitioners used imperial language and rhetoric to present their identities as free persons and 
help support their claims for freedom, it is important to ask, then, what authority Atlantic empires 
had in the Americas, and where. For example, was imperial power focused in territorial holdings 
like colonies? Or was the power of an empire more concentrated at the metropole with the seat of 
the monarchy and crown? Further, would empires hold power and authority in jurisdictions not 
their own, such as the antebellum US South? In other words, would legal officials in New Orleans 
have been compelled to honor or employ freedom laws of Iberian, British, and French empires for 
these litigants?  
Building off of the last question above in relation to antebellum US courts and legal 
officials, did the fact that petitioners were from Atlantic empires and claimed imperial subjecthood 
matter to antebellum legal officials adjudicating freedom suits in local courts in the US South? 
Legal officials were most concerned with whether a person was in fact free. Therefore, what 
importance did petitioners' narratives about where they were from and to what empire they pledged 
loyalty play in legal officials' decisions on their freedom suits? Did judges take into consideration 
where petitioners were from, what empires they belonged, and if they were indeed imperial 
subjects?  In short, while facts about where they were from and what empires they belonged to 
were certainly important to petitioners, did their imperial narratives work as a legal strategy to 
convince legal authorities of their status as free persons? 
This thesis explores how petitioners went to court for their freedom, created narratives that 
highlighted their status as a free person, and articulated their identities in connection to Atlantic 
empires. Cases like Lewis, Gomez, and Marie Francoise's were not unique and, in courtrooms 
across the nineteenth-century American South, enslaved and free Africans from places like Saint-
Domingue, Cuba, Jamaica, and Brazil went to court and attempted to gain their freedom from illicit 
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slave traders, pirates, and former masters. In states like Louisiana, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Florida, and more, petitioners and their witnesses told the courts that they were born 
free, manumitted or emancipated, or lived as free persons in the Atlantic.  
Litigants supported their legal claims with stories about their lived experiences that they 
thought best reflected themselves and their identities as free persons. Their narratives engaged 
common tropes associated with freedom that represented themselves, their identities, and their 
status as free - such as military service, skilled and artisanal labor, and free movement across the 
Caribbean, to name a few.7 For example, they told judges that they gained their freedom after 
serving as grenadiers in black militias during the Haitian Revolution, moved freely across the 
Caribbean from Havana for work as a sailor, or worked as a free person and skilled cook on a 
British ship in Jamaica and Liverpool. In their narratives, being free was also connected with their 
identities as mobile, skilled, and knowledgeable free persons. 
Like Lewis, Gomez, and Marie Francoise, many petitioners also articulated their identities 
as free persons by connecting themselves to Atlantic empires. Within narratives about free 
movement, military service cut short, skilled labor, and families left behind, petitioners often 
declared themselves free persons "belonging to the Dominion of his Catholic Majesty the King 
of Spain," " born a subject of the King of Great Britain," and "French subjects."  
While petitioners certainly told legal officials where they came from in the Atlantic in order 
provide information about where they traveled or previously resided, this information meant much 
more than geographic origin. To petitioners, it was vital to include these comments about their 
connections to Atlantic empires in order to represent themselves, their identities, and their status 
                                                             
7 See Kelly Kennington, In the Shadow of Dred Scott: St. Louis Freedom Suits and the Legal Culture of 
Slavery in Antebellum America (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2017) for more on broad patterns in 
narratives in freedom-claiming in law.  
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as free. They told courts to what empires they enjoyed membership, pledged loyalty, and were 
subjects. In cases like Candido Gomez's, he stated that he was born free in the Kingdom of Brazil 
and, simultaneously, created a link between himself as a free person with the Brazilian Portuguese 
empire. Likewise, in John Lewis's case, he stated that he had lived freely and was recognized as a 
free man in "the kingdom of Great Britain." Petitioners also enlisted ideas about subjecthood in 
their narratives.8 Marie Francoise called upon her mother's connection to the French government 
and status as a "French subject" to bolster her filial claims to freedom for her sons. Ultimately, to 
the petitioners, their identities as free persons were also tied to their identities as members of an 
empire from across the Atlantic World. In short, imperial membership served as yet another way 
for petitioners to perform and represent themselves as free persons. 
Cases initiated by petitioners from different corners of the Atlantic World are at the heart 
of this project. As a comparative project, this thesis does not focus on one jurisdiction, empire, or 
region in the Atlantic or antebellum US South. Rather, it views petitions by litigants with origins 
from across the Atlantic World in a discourse together to demonstrate the interconnected ways that 
they used the law to gain their freedom. Similar patterns of legal narratives emerge when viewing 
cases by litigants from Jamaica, Cuba, Brazil, Saint-Domingue, and more together, and suggest 
that their legal strategies and claims speak to a larger Atlantic phenomenon of freedom-claiming.9 
                                                             
8 This work defines subjecthood as the vertical relationship between an individual and a sovereign and where 
subjecthood operated in a reciprocal relationship of loyalty from the individual that compelled protections and 
obligations from a sovereign figure and administration. See Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
 
9 This project approaches the freedom petitions in terms of how litigants strategically navigated the law to 
gain their freedom. It looks at freedom-claiming as a process and seeks to better understand the ways that slaves and 
free blacks framed their narratives as they engaged the law. Therefore, the outcome of these petitions is not a central 
focus to this project. Courts and judges dismissed cases for various reason and outcomes were influenced by a number 
of factors. To do a study that incorporates the outcomes of the petitions to a greater degree will require a larger and 
more representative sample of freedom petitions. Rather than outcome, this paper looks at the legal process of the 
petitions and the formation of the petitioners' legal consciousness. It examines how the petitioners created narratives, 
articulated their identities and themselves as litigants, and how they accessed the law across imperial borders. Its 
overarching goal is to examine how they understood broad ideas about law and their rights within it, the ways they 
9 
 
This research utilized the Race and Slavery Petitions Project which contains thousands of 
legal cases involving free and enslaved blacks in antebellum America.10 These petitions often 
included plaintiff, defendant, and witness testimonies, comments by legal officials such as judges, 
notaries, and court clerks, and insights into legal access for slaves and free blacks in the antebellum 
American South. Many of the petitions were complicated and multilayered as petitioners crossed 
several spatial, temporal, and generational boundaries. Further, as reflected in Figure 0.1 below, 
the court documents could be often difficult to read, damaged, or influenced by a court clerk's 
cross-hatched writing. 
Figure 1: Excerpt from Candido Gomez's freedom petition and his witness's testimony from 
Candido Gomez's, 1818. This excerpt reflects the ways that court officials transcribed witness 
testimonies, often with third-person phrases such as "witness knows" and "says," as well as 
referring to legal actors as witness, plaintiff, and more. Transcription of this except can be found 
in footnote citation below.11  
 
                                                             
made legal claims for freedom across imperial borders, and where they envisioned themselves within the 
interconnected Atlantic World. 
 
10 Loren Schweninger, Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures and County 
Courts, 1775-1867, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2000-2009.  
 
11 Figure 1 Transcription: "1. Jose Barbosa for Plff [plaintiff]. Witness knows the plff there are upwards of 
15 years at his father and mother's house in the Bay of St. Salvador; says he was born about 1/2 mile of[f] St. Salvador 
that the witness's mother is his [Gomez's] godmother - says that he last saw him there about 7 years ago, that when he 
last saw him there he was free and shoe [next page] maker..." 
10 
 
These cases contained more than just the voice of the litigant, as well, such as legal voices 
and filters from attorneys, court clerks and transcribers, and judges that often obscured the original 
voice of the petitioner. Court clerks transcribed testimonies in third-person, made notes on the 
margins, and ambiguous references to third parties. Also, petitioners seldom petitioned alone and 
went to court with legal aid such as attorneys who wrote their petitions using formulaic legal 
jargon. Despite the legal filters that existed in these petitions, historians have recently proven that 
enslaved and free black litigants in the Atlantic World and Americas maintained degrees of control 
over their cases, continued to pursue them over time, and inserted their voices within the layers of 
legal formula.12 
Another especially important voice in these petitions are from the witnesses that vouched 
for the legal claims by the petitioners. Witnesses serve as a valuable window into Atlantic networks 
in the nineteenth century and reveal what kind of access petitioners had to social and community 
groups. For example, in Candido Gomez's case, a family friend in Salvador, Brazil, shipmates 
onboard the Falcon, and a New Orleans port officer all added valuable testimonies and personal 
anecdotes. Petitioners took a calculated risk by calling upon witnesses and those they knew to 
testify for them. Sometimes neighbors and friends might agree with their claims and add veracity 
to their testimonies. In other instances, witnesses complicated petitioners' claims and called into 
question their rights to freedom. Whether they confirmed or contradicted petitioners, witnesses 
connected litigants to larger community and social networks across the Atlantic World. 
                                                             
12 For example, although the Iberville court denied Marie Francoise's case, her children continued to pursue 
the case in court later. Also, legal historians have shown that marginalized groups using the law often engaged the 
legal process to great degrees and that historians can still access, to an extent, the voice and perspective of the 
petitioners. For some examples, see Bianca Premo, Ordinary Litigants in the Age of the Enlightenment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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This thesis engages historiographical discourses on claims-making and narrative 
performing across borders in the Atlantic World and views cases like Lewis, Gomez, and Marie 
Francoise's together in order to examine the Anglo, Iberian, French, and antebellum in 
interconnected terms. Scholars such as Frank Tannenbaum, Jane Landers, Rebecca Scott, 
Alejandro de la Fuente and Ariela Gross, Graham Nessler, Camillia Cowling, Kimberly Welch, 
Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus, and more have in recent decades demonstrated the importance 
of studying borders and comparative Atlantic spaces to demonstrate the degrees to which the 
Atlantic was an 'entangled' space.13 Their works examine the Americas as a broad, connected, and 
comparative stage, and have shown that slaves and free blacks across the Americas often engaged 
the law in similar ways. In addition, this thesis places itself in historiographical discourses on 
narrative, performance, and story-telling in legal history.14 Antebellum US scholarship on freedom 
suits and slaves and free blacks' access to law is especially important to this study and works by 
scholars such as Kelly Kennington, Ann Twitty, Judith Schafer, Martha Jones, and Kim Welch, 
among others, place the legal practices of slaves and free blacks from across the Atlantic World in 
a comparative legal context in the Americas.15 For example, their work helps to compare cases 
                                                             
13 Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles (2010); Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus, The Plantation Machine: 
Atlantic Capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2016); Rebecca Scott, Freedom Papers: An Atlantic Voyage in the Age of Emancipation, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014);  Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente, "Slaves, free blacks, and race in the legal regimes 
of Cuba, Louisiana, and Virginia: a comparison," North Carolina Law Review, June 2013, Vol. 91; Graham Nessler, 
An Islandwide Struggle for Freedom: Revolution, Emancipation, and Reenslavement in Hispaniola, 1789-1809, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Camillia Cowling, Conceiving Freedom: Women of Color, 
Gender, and the Abolition of Slavery in Havana and Rio de Janeiro (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2013); for the Atlantic World as an 'entangled' space, see Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories: Borderland 
Historiographies in New Clothes?" in The American Historical Review, 2007, Vol. 112. 
 
14 Kimberly Welch, Black Litigants in the Antebellum American South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2018); Premo, Ordinary Litigants (2017); Gross, What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial 
in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Robert Cover, "Forward: Nomos and Narrative," Harvard 
Law Review 97 (1983-84): 4-68. 
 
15 Kennington, In the Shadow of Dred Scott (2017); Anne Twitty, Before Dred Scott: Slavery and Legal 
Culture in the American Confluence, 1787-1857, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Judith Kelleher 
Schafer, Becoming Free, Remaining Free: Manumission and Enslavement in New Orleans, 1846-1862, (Baton Rouge: 
12 
 
like Marie Francoise, Candido Gomez, and John Lewis's that spanned the Caribbean and Atlantic 
in a more comparative manner. For example, the cases in this study are quite similar to freedom 
suits by slaves and free blacks trafficked, kidnapped, or illegally enslaved from across northern 
and southern jurisdictions in antebellum America. 
This thesis contributes to the above scholars' work on the Atlantic World, slavery and 
freedom, and legal narrative and performance. It situates cases by litigants like John Lewis, 
Candido Gomez, and Marie Francoise, as well as many more, together and argues that they cannot 
be viewed in singular as a Latin American or Atlantic history. Rather, they should be viewed in 
larger trends in freedom-claiming in the Americas. Regardless of their diverse and distinct Atlantic 
origins, this research seeks to place these petitions in conversation together within antebellum 
American and nineteenth century Atlantic historiographies. 
To conclude, these cases serve as a window into freedom-claiming in the antebellum US 
South connected to the larger Atlantic World. Legal officials in places like Louisiana, Kentucky, 
the Carolinas, Florida, and more adjudicated freedom petitions based on petitioners' ability to 
prove their free status. Therefore, petitioners asserted first and foremost that they were free and 
made central to their claims that they were free by birth, emancipation, or manumission. In order 
to support their legal claims, litigants also created narratives that presented themselves as free 
persons and they articulated, performed, and reflected their identities, lived experiences, and status 
with tropes associated with freedom like mobility, skilled labor, and community support. 
Another way that petitioners presented themselves as free persons was by connecting their 
identities with Atlantic empires. In their narratives, slaves and free blacks envisioned themselves 
                                                             
Louisiana State University, 2003); Martha Jones, "Time, Space, and Jurisdiction in Atlantic World Slavery: the 
Volunbrun Household in Gradual Emancipation New York," Law and History Review, 2011, 29: 4, pp. 1031-1060; 
Welch, Black Litigants (2018) 
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- and their identities as free persons - in close connection to empires, sovereign figures, and 
subjecthood. For example, they linked themselves to the Spanish, Portuguese, British, and French 
empires as imperial subjects and asserted relationships between themselves and kings. 
Despite articulating their identity as free persons in connection with Atlantic empires, 
though, proving freedom was still the central motivation of their petitions. As seen in the outcomes 
of these cases, legal officials seldom adjudicated on terms of Atlantic belonging and imperial 
subjecthood and, rather, focused on slaves' ability to prove their status as free person with freedom 
papers. In local courts in the US South, legal officials cared primarily whether slaves proved their 
free status convincingly and rarely decided cases on where petitioners belonged, to what empire 
they pledged loyalty, or what king recognized them as a subject. As a result, illegally enslaved free 
blacks from across the Atlantic framed their petitions primarily with assertions of their status and 
rights to freedom. 
Nonetheless, in petitions spanning the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century, slaves and 
free blacks continued to incorporate notions of Atlantic empires and subjecthood in their freedom 
petitions to varying degrees - even if it served little legal strategical purpose to a US court. Their 
narratives illuminate the vital importance that imperial belonging and subjecthood represented to 
Atlantic slaves and free blacks in petitioning for freedom in the US South and suggest that they 
understood membership to an empire as a way to embody and articulate their experiences and 
identities as free persons. To them, being members of an empire or subjects to a king was 
synonymous with freedom. Ultimately, slaves and free blacks from across the Atlantic Caribbean 
brought Atlantic imperial notions to support their claims to freedom in southern courts, compelled 
legal officials to consider their claims for freedom in broader Atlantic terms, and positioned 
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themselves and their identities as free persons in close connection to empires, sovereign figures, 
and subjecthood. 
Thesis Organization 
This thesis proceeds in three parts that work together to demonstrate the similar and 
interconnected ways that petitioners created narratives in court. First, in chapter two, this thesis 
provides a top-down examination of the Atlantic World as a unique and interconnected legal space. 
It reviews historiographical research in the Americas on slavery and law, legal constructs across 
the circum-Caribbean, and historical transformations in the early nineteenth century. By looking 
at the ways scholars have approached the Americas, how law and legal procedures on slavery and 
freedom shaped slaves' experiences and legal consciousness connected to pursing freedom, and 
important historical changes in the Caribbean like the Haitian Revolution and the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade, this chapter argues that slaves and free blacks' experiences in the Atlantic World and 
in connection to slavery and freedom-claiming in law were connected by shared experiences. 
Next, chapters three and four closely examine the narratives within the freedom petitions and 
provide close readings of the petitioners and their witnesses' testimonies. This approach to the 
petitions reveals some of the ways that slaves and free blacks articulated their identities as free 
persons to support their legal claims. For example, chapter three explores the ways that litigants 
articulated their identities as free persons in connection to their membership in an empire. This 
chapter argues that, to petitioners, their connections to sovereign figures like kings at the 
metropole, their status as imperial subjects, and their connections and membership in general to 
an empire were important in how they identified themselves as free persons. In other words, 
holding membership and being loyal to an empire, being connected to a king, and being part of a 
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political institution as an imperial subject were closely related with freedom to them and was 
important to how they formed and presented their identities as free persons in their legal narratives.  
Chapter four likewise examines narratives in the freedom suits - although this time from 
petitioners' witnesses. Community members and witnesses in the petitions served an important 
role in litigation and friends, family, neighbors, and acquaintances' testimonies reveal important 
information about petitioners' identities and how they presented themselves to their communities. 
Ultimately, witness testimonies reflect the intricate Atlantic social networks to which petitioners 
belonged. Overall, the chapters in this thesis seek to provide a window into nineteenth-century 
freedom-claiming in law that reflects the Americas - and the experiences of the litigants - in 
connected and comparative terms.  
16 
 
CHAPTER 2 
"ALTOGETHER REMEDILESS IN THE PREMISES AT LAW:" HISTORIOGRAPHY, LAW, 
AND ATLANTIC HISTORIES IN THE CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN 
In 1804, Joseph Antoine petitioned for his freedom while held in jail in Kentucky.16 He 
sued three slaveholders and slave traders on the basis of illegal enslavement and fraud, and stated 
that "he is a freeman & can establish this fact to the satisfaction" of the court. He asked legal 
officials to "enjoin & restrain" Jonathan Purcel, Emanuel Lisa, and Davis Floyd, and anyone else, 
from "interfering with [his freedom] & that he may be permitted to remain free from restraint."  
Antoine presented the court with a heartbreaking story that spanned the Iberian and 
antebellum Americas. He stated that he was from Cuba and formerly a slave. He told officials that 
"at the Havana he was the property of a certain [...] who...emancipated him" and that he had proof 
of his freedom "by a Deed of Emancipation which your Orator prays may be taken as part of this 
bill.17" Then a free man in Cuba, Antoine decided to resettle and he moved to Virginia in the United 
States, "where he resided about four years," and married a slave woman, "the property of one 
[Jonathan] Purcel." 
Unfortunately, Antoine and his wife's marriage - and his freedom - were threatened by 
Purcel. Antoine stated that Purcel moved to Post Vincennes, a former French colonial area, and 
Antoine "went with thesd [the said] Purcel" and his wife. However, "not long after thesd Purcel 
got to Vincennes, thesd Purcel insisted that he [Antoine] should indent himself to him." Antoine 
                                                             
16 Petition of Joseph Antoine to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in Jefferson County, Kentucky, 
19, September 1804, Records of the Circuit Court, Case Files, Kentucky Division of Libraries and Archives, 
Frankfort, Kentucky; Granted; in Race and Slavery Petitions Project, Series II: County Court Petitions (Bethesda, 
MD: University Publications of America, 1998), Microfilm edition, Petition Analysis Record No. 20780403. 
 
17 It was typical if slaves had freedom papers or any other official documents to submit them along with their 
petition. 
 
17 
 
"refused to do that," but Purcel proceeded to coerce him and "threatened that if he did not do so, 
that he would send his wife to some part of the Spanish country."  
Purcel further coerced Antoine and his wife, taking them "into a room, & shut the doors & 
again insisted that they should indent themselves for fifteen years & threatened to send them off if 
they refused." Antoine stated in his petition that "by way of allurement," Purcel "promised that his 
[Antoine's] wife should be free at the expiration of that period." "Being thus situated, in a state of 
duress, and being apprehensive that if he refused, that thesd Lacey would put him in Irons and 
send him & sell him as a slave, where he would not have it in his power to recover his freedom," 
Antoine signed the indenture contract."18  
Despite their contract, Antoine was "informed that thesd Purcel was about to sell him & 
his wife" to Emanuel Lisa. Antoine asked Lisa if this was true and "was informed that such was 
the fact." Antoine stated that Lisa "asked him if he was willing" and "that he replied if he was to 
be sold, he would as soon be sold to him, as another." Antoine, "fearing if he refused," worried 
"that thesd Purcel might convey him off & place him in a worse situation." According to Antoine, 
Lisa "did purchase him and his wife" and took them to New Orleans and, there, sold them "as 
slaves for life." 
Learning that he and his wife had been sold by Lisa, Antoine "went to the Spanish Governor 
in Orleans, and shewed him his Deed of Manumission and requested his interposition." Antoine 
stated that "the governor took him and his wife into his custody, and after examination into the 
fact released them from the sale." The governor also "told them if they chose to return with thesd 
[...] to St. [Saint] Lewe the place of his residence that it was a matter of option with them, but that 
                                                             
18 Indentured servitude typically included an agreed upon contract that a person would work for a certain 
person for a defined period of time, typically 7 years.  
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they should not be sold or taken off by thesd Elisa [Emanuel Lisa] unless they would consent to 
go." 
Antoine and his wife's attempts to return home were filled with more coercion and anxiety. 
He stated that they were "anxious to return & upon thesd Elisa [Emanuel Lisa] promising not to 
sell them again & that he would treat them, they consented to return." Further, Antoine was "still 
believing that his wife was a slave unless he served out with her the balance of the term." 
According to Antoine, this all "operated with him as a farther inducement to" return. 
Cruelty and misfortune characterized their return to St. Louis. Antoine stated that Lisa 
"treated them so cruelly that he could no longer remain with him." He and his wife left and fled to 
Kentucky, however, on the way "his wife died." Further, "shortly after his arrival in this county he 
was apprehended & thrown in goal where he remained a few days when he was delivered to a by 
a certain Davis Floyd."19 Antoine stated that "Floyd took him on the other side of the river & was 
offering to sell him." He stated that "Floyd has been endeavoring to take him off," but that Antoine 
was "committed to the Goal of Jefferson County where he is still confined." Antoine claimed that 
"he has good reason to believe" that "Floyd will forcibly deprive him of his liberty & take" him to 
Emanuel Lisa who would "dispose him in such a manner that he will be subjected to a state of 
untitled slavery the balance of his life" and "should he again get possession of him will treat very 
cruelly." In 1804, the court granted Antoine his freedom. 
Joseph Antoine's petition is a fitting case that reflects slavery and law in the nineteenth-
century Atlantic World, especially the Caribbean and the antebellum American South. His case 
tells a narrative of emancipation and freedom in Cuba, of the vulnerability of love and marriage 
under slavery in the US South, and coercion and cruelty in the antebellum slave trade. In fact, 
                                                             
19 Goal is in reference to a holding jail. 
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Antoine's petition is a highly cited case in the historiography of the antebellum US South, and 
scholars such as John Franklin Hope, Betty DeRamus, and Loren Schweninger examined his case 
in reference to runaway slaves, slave marriages and relationships, and law.20 For example, 
DeRamus explored Antoine's case, the lack of legal standing in his marriage to a slave woman, 
and the legal restrictions imposed on slaves in the antebellum US South. In her study, she stated 
that Antoine was a savvy litigant who knew how to write and was literate, as well.21 
Through Antoine's case, we can also see the ways that he asserted his status and constructed 
his identity as a free person. For example, Antoine created a rich narrative that asserted his free 
status. He told the court that he was legally emancipated in Cuba, referenced his former owner by 
name, and stated that he could prove his freedom by "a deed of manumission." Further, he told 
legal officials in Kentucky that his status as a free person had already been recognized in another 
legal jurisdiction by the Spanish Governor in Louisiana.22 Ultimately, he stated that he was a free 
person because he was emancipated, had freedom papers, and had another jurisdiction - the 
Spanish empire in Louisiana - recognize his freedom. 
Antoine also told the court about his lived experiences as a free person to support his legal 
claims and represent his identity as free. For example, he presented himself as a free person in 
reference to his geographic mobility in the Atlantic. After gaining his freedom in Cuba, he freely 
moved across the Atlantic and chose to migrate and resettle in Virginia as a free and independent 
                                                             
20 John Franklin Hope and Loren Schweninger, Runway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Betty DeRamus, Forbidden Fruit: Love Stories from the Underground Railroad, (New York: 
Atria Books, 2005); Loren Schweninger, The Southern Debate over Slavery: Petitions to Southern County Courts, 
1775-1867, Volume 2 (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008). 
 
21 DeRamus, Forbidden Fruit (2005). 
  
22 Spain briefly held Louisiana as an imperial territory from 1762 to 1802. For more information on Spanish 
Louisiana, see bibliography entries for Kimberly Hanger and Judith Kelleher Schaffer. 
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man. Empire also played an important role in how Antoine articulated his identity as a free man. 
For example, he presented himself and his identity as a free person by referencing his connection 
to the Iberian empire, territory, and legal jurisdiction in Louisiana.  Originally from Cuba as a free 
man and later recognized as a free person in Spanish Louisiana, Antoine asserted his identity as a 
former member of the Iberian empire alongside his status as a free man. 
For the purposes of this chapter, Antoine's case serves as a useful starting point to examine 
slavery and freedom, law and legal procedure, and Atlantic historical transformations in the 
nineteenth-century Americas. This chapter aims at exploring the Americas in comparative terms. 
First, it addresses broad trends and patterns in the historiography of the Americas. Across 
antebellum American, Caribbean, and Latin American histories, scholars have increasingly viewed 
the Americas on an interconnected stage. Rather than looking at the histories of slavery in 
antebellum America, Latin America, and the Caribbean in separate terms, historians have 
increasingly produced important comparative scholarship that presents larger Atlantic perspectives 
that examine Iberian, British, French, and antebellum slavery in connected terms and have created 
a discourse on "entangled Atlantic" spaces.23 Their works have demonstrated that different legal 
jurisdictions and constructs in law across the Caribbean were not as distinct as once thought.  
To build on this historiographical discourse, this chapter then explores the law, legal 
processes, and historical transformations in the Atlantic World connected to freedom-claiming in 
the Americas, especially in Iberian and antebellum law. While petitioners came from across 
distinct legal jurisdictions with unique laws related to slavery and freedom-claiming, they each 
had a broad legal consciousness - or an individuals' understanding about the law and their rights 
                                                             
23 For more on "entangled" spaces in the Atlantic world, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Entangled Histories," 
(2007) and Eliga Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery," The 
American Historical Review, 2007, Vol. 112. 
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within it - about their rights to pursue their freedom in law.24 Also, petitioners likewise had similar 
shared experiences in connection to major historical events like the Haitian Revolution or the trans-
Atlantic slave trade that they articulated in their narratives to give their freedom claims and 
identities as free persons a broader, Atlantic context. 
Ultimately, the Atlantic World was a legal space in which petitioners' experiences, 
identities, and narratives were connected across borders and jurisdictions. Law and legal processes 
connected to slavery and freedom-claiming across the Caribbean and Atlantic Americas, while 
distinct and unique depending on jurisdiction, nonetheless had some shared similarities. For 
example, laws across Atlantic empires provided some opportunities at different degrees for slaves 
to pursue their freedom in court. As a result, slaves and free blacks across the Atlantic were 
knowledgeable about their rights in law to pursue their freedom and engaged a growing legal 
consciousness on their rights to freedom in law whether it was in Iberian, antebellum, or other 
Atlantic legal jurisdictions. Overall, after moving across the Atlantic and once in the US and in 
court, petitioners crafted legal narratives that presented their status and identities as free persons 
to gain their freedom and demonstrated how they envisioned and viewed the Atlantic World to a 
degree, namely in connected and persistent terms where laws that governed them under the 
Spanish, British, and French empires in the Caribbean ought to continue to protect them despite 
movement across borders.  
  
                                                             
 
24 This thesis uses the definition of legal consciousness from Kelly Kennington's work on freedom petitions 
in St. Louis and the antebellum US South in In the Shadow of Dred Scott (2017). On page 4, she defines legal 
consciousness as "individuals' view of law, their experience of the law, and the considerations they make when 
approaching the legal system for assistance." Also, she states that legal consciousness falls within her definition of 
legal culture on page 4 as "the constellation of attitudes and experiences concerning law in a particular time and place 
- separate from formal legal institutions like statutes and court proceedings..." 
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Historiography of Freedom, Slavery, and Law in the Atlantic World 
In December 1775, Antonio Muray petitioned the Justices of the Peace at the Inferior Court of 
Craven County in North Carolina for his freedom.25 Muray told the court that in 1769 "your 
unhappy petitioner, left a wife and children in the Havanah; shipped himself on board a vessel 
bound to Jamaica and arrived at Jamaica and from thence to Carthagene [Cartagena] and back to 
Jamaica.26" He stated that on his voyage across the Caribbean, "he had lent one of the sailors (John 
Taylor by name) a pistole while at Cathagene [Cartagena]" and that "on their return to Jamaica a 
dispute happened which the said John Taylor struck" Muray. Affronted, Muray "returned blows" 
and "being a black man was taken up at the instance or complaint of the said John Taylor." In 
Jamaica, Muray found himself "committed to a goal, for which assault he was not prosecuted.27" 
Apparently, Muray was confined to the jail in Jamaica for some time. He stated that, "after 
being detained several three months in the said goal until as I understood five or six pounds was 
due for the fees of the goal," "a certain Timothy Clear and Capt. [Captain] Roberts came" and 
"talked about purchasing some negros that were in the goal & at last agreed with the goaler to pay 
the goal fees and take out your petitioner [Muray] and another free negro which was in the same 
goal."28 Muray stated that "Mr. Clear pd. [paid] the fees for me, and Capt. [Captain] Roberts paid 
                                                             
25 Petition of Antonio Muray to the Inferior Court of Craven County, North Carolina, December 1775, 
Records of the County Court, Civil Actions Concerning Slaves and Free Persons of Color 1788-1860, Antonio Muray 
v. [no named defendants], NCDAH, Raleigh, North Carolina; Denied; in Race and Slavery Petitions Project, Series 
II: County Court Petitions (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), Microfilm edition, Petition 
Analysis Record No. 21277501. 
  
26 "Carthagene" refers to present day Cartagena, Colombia. 
 
27 Goal refers to a holding prison. 
 
28 Muray's petition especially demonstrates the ways that legal cases can show, to some extent, the voice of 
the petitioner. In many cases, legal filters such as court clerks' transcribing and legal jargon by attorneys influenced 
and obscured the petitioners' voices and perspectives. In particular, court clerks' annotations of interviews and 
testimonies in the third person create confusing links between the persons involved in the case. All of these aspects 
makes accessing the voice and perspective of the petitioner and their witnesses more difficult for legal historians. 
However, Muray's petition offers a closer view of the voice of the petitioner. While indeed containing legal jargon by 
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for the other, but before we left the goal an indenture was made for six or seven years" between 
Muray and Clear. Muray stated that Clear "promised to set me at liberty as soon as I had earned 
the value of the money which he paid." Finally released from the holding prison in Jamaica, Muray 
began an indenture contract with Clear. 
Muray stated that the indenture included "fair promises of the said Timothy Clear, (that he 
would use me kindly and not detain me any longer than sufficient to reimburse him for about the 
sum of six pounds which was all he paid for me)." However, Muray claimed that Clear did not 
abide by the "fair promises" during the indenture. Instead, he stated that Clear "hath treated me 
cruelly, by unmerciful whippings, frequently for six years." Muray further stated that Clear, "not 
being satisfied with my labor as a slave during the said term, sold me again fo to my present master 
Thomas Parsons, who treats me very ill." 
Muray concluded his petition to the Inferior Court at Craven County by appealing to legal 
"justice and humanity." He stated that "your poor petitioner humbly prays that your worships will 
take my unhappy case into serious consideration, and do what justice and humanity requires to be 
done in the premises." At the end of the petition, a Mr. Codgell, likely Muray's attorney or legal 
aid, signed for him. Despite legal assistance and a compelling case, however, the court denied his 
request. 
Antonio Muray's petition offers a valuable glimpse at free black society, slavery, and law 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries in the Atlantic World. For example, Muray's narrative 
reflects some of the lived experiences of free black sailors and their skilled work on ships. While 
his petition did not indicate what his line of work was - the slave trade or a cook on a ship, for 
                                                             
his attorney and legal aid and full of formulaic writing such as "the said John Taylor," his case often oscillates between 
legal writing and first-person narrative, suggesting a closer connection to the voice of the enslaved petitioner. 
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example - Muray sailed from Havana to Cartagena and Jamaica, and was likely knowledgeable 
about the Atlantic World and the places he traveled. His petition also reflects some of the ways 
that free blacks became illegally enslaved in the Atlantic. Muray's enslavement resulted from his 
unfortunate circumstances in jail that led to his indenture and eventual enslavement in North 
Carolina. Muray's case also reflects the Americas as an interconnected space as he traveled across 
Iberian, British, and American borders as both a free and enslaved man. 
Muray's petition raises many questions in relation to the Americas as an interconnected space 
and especially in connection to the diverse selection of freedom petitions and their petitioners' 
origins in this thesis. For example, are there significant differences or similarities in freedom 
petitions by litigants coming from places like Cuba, Brazil, Jamaica, French Saint-Domingue, and 
more? Did Iberian, British, French, or antebellum legal constructs influence the ways that 
petitioners litigated for their freedom across borders? Further, can historians view these cases and 
their narratives side by side with antebellum cases for freedom, such as a petitioner from Illinois 
in the illicit slave trade in the antebellum US South? Finally, should these cases and the litigants 
behind them be examined separately as products of the individual jurisdictions, empires or 
republics that they came from, or do they represent a larger Atlantic pattern of legal claims-making 
that should be viewed together? 
These questions and comparisons together are important for producing scholarship that 
looks at the Americas in interconnected terms in the Atlantic World, and scholars have grappled 
with these questions in their work on the Americas. This section examines the ways that scholars 
in the US, Atlantic World, and Latin America show similar theories and approaches regarding the 
experiences of slaves and free blacks in the Americas in comparative terms. The scholarship on 
slavery and law in the Atlantic World explored below together demonstrate that historians 
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increasingly examine the Americas in interconnected terms, rather than exclusionary or separate 
ideas. While the legal jurisdictions that litigants came from certainly played a role in shaping how 
slaves and free blacks understood, accessed, and used the courts (antebellum Georgia certainly had 
different laws and legal customs in comparison to nineteenth-century Havana), slaves and free 
blacks by and large engaged more similar than dissimilar strategies to gain their freedom. They 
each created narratives that emphasized their status as free persons and, further, told courts stories 
about their lived experiences and identities as free persons. Indeed, the historians' works below 
situate slavery and law as themes which should not be viewed in a vacuum or in individual 
republics, empires, or borders. Rather, slavery, freedom, and law present interesting connections 
across the Atlantic World that should be viewed in comparison and in the context of the larger 
circum-Atlantic history. 
Beginning first with his classic study on slavery and law in the Americas, Frank Tannenbaum 
positioned slavery in Iberian colonies in Latin America and the Caribbean as legally distinct and 
less harsh from Anglo colonies and nations like Jamaica and the United States.29 Tannenbaum 
stated that under Iberian empires in the Americas, slaves and free blacks had greater access to and 
success in legal institutions due to the recognition of their legal and religious personhood in 
connection to Roman Catholic law and ecclesiastical authority.30  
Tannenbaum's thesis comparing these two jurisdictions has played a significant role in shaping 
the discourse on slavery in the Americas. It has compelled scholars to view the region as a 
comparative space, and historians have added to and differed from the main points of his thesis. 
In recent decades, historians have provided new insights to his framework, explored slavery and 
                                                             
29 Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas, (New York, A.A. Knopf, 1947). 
 
30 Ibid. 
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law across the circum-Atlantic, and increasingly view the Americas as interconnected spaces of 
slavery and law.  
For example, Camillia Cowling explored women's claims to freedom and citizenship in the 
late-nineteenth century in Brazil and Cuba.31 Her work gains a comparative value that allows 
scholars who might focus solely on Brazil or Cuba to view that history in a larger Atlantic 
discourse. Also, Michelle McKinley reworked Tannenbaum's thesis by adding a gendered 
dimension to it and explored the historical practice of 'forum-shopping,' or the ability of slaves and 
other marginalized groups like women, indigenous peoples, and children, to make legal appeals to 
secular, ecclesiastical, and military courts depending on which would best serve their interests.32 
Further, scholars such as Bianca Premo, Graham Nessler, Ariela Gross and Alejandro de 
la Fuente, Jane Landers, Rebecca Scott, and more connect their work with special consideration to 
Atlantic borders, law, and empire in the Americas.33 Bianca Premo examined the Enlightenment 
in lawsuits by those she considered "ordinary litigants," namely women, indigenous peoples, and 
slaves, in the Spanish empire.34 Her work did not examine one colony and, instead, she examined 
three jurisdictions in the Spanish empire. Similarly, Graham Nessler examined the aftermath of 
the Haitian Revolution and argued that it is important to look beyond French Saint-Domingue to 
                                                             
31 Camillia Cowling, Conceiving Freedom: Women of Color, Gender, and the Abolition of Slavery in Havana 
and Rio de Janeiro (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
 
32 Michelle McKinley, Fractional Freedoms: Slavery, Intimacy, and Legal Mobilization in Colonial Lima 
from 1600-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Bianca Premo also explores forum-shopping in 
Ordinary Litigants (2017), as does Kelly Kennington in In the Shadow of Dred Scott (2017). 
 
33 Bianca Premo, Ordinary Litigants (2017); Graham Nessler, An Islandwide Struggle for Freedom, (2016); 
Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente, "Slaves, free blacks, and race in the legal regimes of Cuba, Louisiana, and 
Virginia: A Comparison," North Carolina Law Review, June 2013, Vol. 91; Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles (2010); 
Rebecca Scott, Freedom Papers, (2014). 
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better understand the revolution's effects for slaves and free blacks.35 To do so, he examined legal 
claims for freedom by slaves and free blacks from Saint-Domingue displaced across the Spanish 
border of Hispaniola in Santo Domingo.  
Scholars of North America also added to the discourse of an interconnected Atlantic World 
by demonstrating the strategic ways that slaves and free blacks used the law. Works by scholars 
such as Ira Berlin, Kimberly Welch, Kelly Kennington, and Anne Twitty demonstrate that slaves 
and free blacks in the antebellum US South accessed the law to great degrees and were equally 
strategic in North America as their counterparts in the Caribbean or Latin America, as well as 
connected to a larger Atlantic World.36  
Legal history theory also contributed to the discourse on slavery and freedom in law. For 
example, Barbara Young Welke's work on the long nineteenth century in the United States 
examines ideas of national belonging in terms of citizenry and legal personhood.37 She argues that 
concepts of citizenship and personhood were mainly articulated through and defined by models of 
white, male authority, and that gendered and racialized authority persisted in law due to the 
consistent subordination of others, namely, non-white or male historical actors in relation to 
citizenship and personhood such as women, slaves, free blacks, and the disabled. 
Welke's work focuses on the nineteenth-century US, however, legal theory in this piece is 
especially valuable for working through ideas of slavery, freedom, and law in the Atlantic World. 
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36 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000); Kimberly Welch, Black Litigants (2018); Kennington, In the Shadow of Dred Scott 
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For example, she frames her work with the term "borders of belonging.38" By borders, she states 
that they mean both physical spaces - like geographical borders, for instance - as well as figurative 
borders, stating "it refers equally to physical and psychic personhood (self-ownership) and to the 
legal consequences assigned to gendered or racialized elements of individual identity.39" This legal 
concept of the "borders of belonging" allow historians to evaluate space in physical and geographic 
terms, but also in more conceptual terms like individual relationships and the self. 
Overall, the above comparative works by scholars in recent decades have provided a 
contrast to Tannenbaum's original framework on slavery, freedom, and law. Rather than being 
largely distinct across Iberian and Anglo jurisdictions, these historians have demonstrated that 
across Atlantic borders slaves and free blacks' experiences and activities in law have more 
similarities than not. While these jurisdictions and laws certainly differed, recent work by 
historians have demonstrated that slaves and free blacks strategically navigated the legal sphere to 
access and protect their freedom in law in similar ways across the Atlantic World and in both 
Iberian and antebellum contexts. 
"Permitted to Remain Free from Restraint:" Iberian and Antebellum Legal Constructs on Slavery 
and Freedom 
The above historiographical works serve as a useful point of departure to examine law and 
legal processes connected to slavery and freedom in the Atlantic World, Latin America, and the 
antebellum US South. As scholars have grappled with the Americas on a connected stage, this 
section likewise explores law, legal culture, and legal consciousness in interconnected terms and 
in relation to race, slavery, and freedom across Atlantic borders in the nineteenth century. Iberian 
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and antebellum law and legal constructs connected to slavery and freedom serve as an especially 
useful area of analysis. For example, in both Iberian and antebellum jurisdictions, limited legal 
options existed for slaves and free blacks to pursue or protect their freedom in law. In Cuba, courts 
and specially appointed lawyers represented illegally enslaved individuals, as well as slaves who 
sought to change masters, in court. In the US South, slaves could petition for their freedom, as 
well, and the specific type of process depended on state jurisdiction. Overall, by examining law 
and legal procedures across the Atlantic World and especially in relation to slavery and freedom, 
this section explores slaves and free blacks' legal consciousness, or awareness, of their rights and 
access to the law to gain or protect their freedom. Ultimately, regardless of where they came from 
in the Atlantic World, petitioners were knowledgeable about their rights to pursue their freedom 
in court and they navigated legal structures to gain their freedom across borders in the Atlantic. 
Beginning from a broad Atlantic and Caribbean perspective, in French Saint-Domingue, 
British Jamaica, and Spanish Cuba, legal and political structures in the imperial colonies shaped 
the lived experiences of slaves and free blacks. Authority in French Saint-Domingue was largely 
concentrated at the European metropole in France, and laws and legislation descended from elite 
power in the colonial governor or royal officials in Versailles.40 Any colonial voice in legislation 
or law-making came from powerful slaveholders and planters on the island, typically in positions 
of legal authority like judges who were directly appointed by imperial officials in France.41  
On the other hand, colonial authority in British Jamaica was held more locally and, in British 
colonies, wealthy planters were able to gain positions of power and authority in law-making.42 
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High seats of power appointed by the crown were relatively weak and imperial governors in 
Jamaica held little control over colonial practices.43 In effect, local planters in Jamaica held 
considerable authority and asserted their rights as British subjects and lawmakers.44 
In connection to slavery and the law in Saint-Domingue and Jamaica, the two imperial colonies 
again differed.45 Saint-Domingue had a code noir, or a black code, since 1685 in which legal 
officials in France outlined restrictions for slaves and free blacks.46 However, Jamaica had no slave 
code and the treatment and legislation of slavery on the island was again left to the discretion of 
powerful slaveholders in positions of legal authority.47 
In the Iberian colonies, power was concentrated in high seats of power, such as governorships 
and audiencias, or Spanish high courts. These positions, like in Saint-Domingue and Jamaica, were 
usually filled by peninsulares, or elite native Spaniards, rather than local criollos, or Spanish-
descended colonials. Further, colonial officials and governors exercised considerable governing 
power in response to royal laws and decrees. Officials often acted within the practice of "obedezco 
pero no cumplo,"(I obey, but do not comply) as a way to skirt royal authority, but maintain 
monarchical allegiance and loyalty.48 
Further, slaves and free blacks in Spanish colonies were considered legal persons. Holding 
legal personhood meant courts and legal institutions largely recognized slaves and free blacks as 
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persons who could appear before court, provide testimony, and seek legal recourse.49 For example, 
free blacks were recognized for their service in black militias and bestowed mercedes, or royal 
honors from imperial courts.50 Further, slaves and free blacks could seek legal recourse for 
grievances in the form of royal petitions and were heard by imperial authorities, even sometimes 
the king.51  
Ecclesiastical and military law and legal institutions also provided slaves and free blacks 
opportunities to seek legal recourse in a number of venues, a practice known as "forum-shopping." 
Under this practice, litigants went to various levels of jurisdiction to find the best legal venue for 
their cases.52 Forum-shopping afforded marginalized groups, including women, slaves, and free 
blacks, opportunities to petition to ecclesiastical and military authorities in secular and religious 
councils and courts. Also, active participation in litigation by subordinated peoples influenced a 
shift more generally in the law, from a justice-oriented culture (based on community adjudication 
and network relations) to a law-oriented culture (based in formal rights and claims, and a demand 
for formal justice).53 
Across secular and legal institutions, Iberian officials sometimes defined enslavement and 
freedom status in ambiguous terms, and slaves and free blacks were able to take advantage of loose 
legal structures to negotiate degrees of freedoms. For example, historian Michelle McKinley 
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provides a comparative analysis into a practice known as "conditional slavery" and examines the 
"in-between" versions of slavery in the Andes in seventeenth-century Lima, specifically women's 
claims for freedom, manumission practices, and the ambiguity of slavery and freedom.54 McKinley 
argues that slavery was not defined in absolute terms and, rather, she states that slaves' lived 
experiences could be better described in terms of quasi-emancipation and conditional freedoms 
where the enslaved accessed degrees of freedom in Iberian colonies.55 She stated that slaves often 
held "fractions" of freedom through methods such as self-purchase, a master's promise of freedom 
clauses in wills, and small-scale manumissions.56 Since slavery and freedom were not absolute, 
McKinley argues that it was instead a constant negotiation between slave and master and, in this 
context, she focuses on gendered manumission practices - adding to Frank Tannenbaum's 
discussion on manumission in the Americas.57 
In Cuba, an Iberian colony through which many petitioners in this thesis were born, had lived, 
or had experiences, laws regarding slaves and free blacks provided important legal opportunities 
and structures for them to protect and pursue their freedom. Historian Alejandro de la Fuente 
provides an especially valuable and broad overview of Cuban slave law and practices of obtaining 
freedom. The practice of coartación, or the act of gradual self-purchase, and pedir papel, the 
process of requesting a change in master, were customary laws in Cuba until the mid-nineteenth 
century.58 Prior to their codification, La Fuente stated that these legal practices were evolving 
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rights for slaves and were mostly customary in practice.59 Further, according to La Fuente, since 
these practices were not legally binding practices until the 1840's, coartación and pedir papel 
placed slaves seeking their freedom through these measures in positions that were “vulnerable to 
the whim of individual masters.60” In 1842, the colonial government issued an updated version of 
the Reglamento de Esclavos, a set of codified laws and rights relating to slaves. In the Reglamento, 
practices such as coartación and pedir papel became codified legal rights for slaves.61 With these 
codified laws, slaves who gained access to courts after 1842 could litigate against their masters for 
the opportunity to purchase their freedom or change masters in official law.  
Although these practices were customary and not legally binding until the mid-nineteenth 
century, it is important to examine how they functioned and influenced the lives of slaves 
throughout the colonial period. First, coartación included the practice of a slave purchasing their 
own freedom and included an agreement between a slave and master on a fixed sale price to the 
slave.62 La Fuente discussed the practice prior to its codification in 1842 and stated that 
“coartación should be seen as an emergent legal institution with poorly defined and contested legal 
effects.63”  
The practice of pedir papel was another legal construct that created contention between slaves 
and their masters, and that functioned as a system of disputed claims of abuses. Masters often 
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litigated in response to and against their slaves who made claims of abuse about them to protect 
their public image.64 When slaves requested pedir papel, it reflected poorly on their masters and 
damaged their status as slaveholders. Their reputation as slaveholders included some obligations 
to their slaves, such as to provide adequate housing and food to them, and, when requests for pedir 
papel arose, it called into question their character and slave practices. Further, La Fuente 
demonstrated that many local judges shared sympathies with slaveholders who felt that the 
customary practice of pedir papel was a public insult and ruled in favor for slaveholders.65 
Although Iberian and, specifically Cuban, laws for slaves and free blacks recognized them as 
legal persons and provided opportunities for them to litigate for their freedom, many colonies still 
maintained a harsh and highly racialized system of slavery and black discrimination. Cuba, as well 
as French and British empires, had a codigo negro, or black code, that defined restrictive legislation 
against slaves and free blacks.66 Further, while slaves and free blacks in Iberian jurisdictions 
enjoyed legal personhood, the opportunities in court for slaves to pursue their freedom could differ 
depending on urban or rural areas. In Havana, slaves could gain access to legal institutions and 
courts connected to imperial authorities and laws, such as the Captaincy General in Havana, the 
highest legal court on the island, to petition for their freedom. On the other hand, laws and legal 
institutions in rural, plantation areas could be influenced by more localized courts and legal 
institutions, as well as powerful individuals in positions of authority aligned with local planters.67 
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Once in the United States from British, French, or Iberian colonies, slaves and free blacks faced 
a new legal environment regarding their freedom and standing in law. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the United States and particularly the antebellum South enacted restrictive 
legislation regarding slaves and free blacks.68 Slaveholders held important positions of power in 
legislation and they enacted slave codes that promoted racial segregation, the perpetuity of slavery 
through maternal ancestry, and the subordination of free blacks in communities.69 For example, 
laws in the nineteenth-century limited slaves' abilities to gain their freedom through emancipation 
or manumission and restricted masters' abilities to manumit their slaves in the North and South, 
requiring masters to financially back their claims that the slave was of good character.70 Further, 
slaves were not recognized as legal persons and, thus, their marriages, property, and claims were 
denied legal standing and protection.71 Free blacks also faced circumscribed liberties in their 
communities and laws existed that required free blacks to carry passes and papers that declared 
them as free persons, denied them the ability to serve in militias, and restricted their right to hold 
property.72 
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While legal restrictions on slaves and free blacks in the US offered few opportunities for legal 
recourse, they could still become litigants in specific cases.73 For example, slaves could seek legal 
recourse to gain and protect their freedom in a number of ways that depended on state jurisdictions. 
The process could be quite different depending on where and when slaves went to court and 
processes largely depended on state statutes and codes.74 Some states allowed slaves to file 
freedom petitions.75 This process provided slaves recognition in court to make the case for their 
freedom and required legal officials to hear their cases and summon an accused enslaver.76 Other 
states required slaves to request a writ of habeas corpus to sue for their freedom.77 Doing so forced 
legal officials to summon an accused enslaver to appear before the court and demonstrate proof 
and cause for holding an enslaved person.78 In these cases, once the person summoned appeared 
before the court, legal officials would evaluate the slaves' claims to freedom.79 
In some state jurisdictions, legal officials made it difficult or inaccessible for slaves to outright 
petition for their freedom in freedom suits or through a writ of habeas corpus. In these instances, 
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slaves could not gain legal access to freedom through direct petitions and they often had to navigate 
indirect legal methods to have their freedom recognized. Nonetheless, slaves continued to use the 
courts in strategic ways to petition for their freedom.  
For example, in state codes and statutes across the antebellum South, other types of processes 
to petition for freedom existed in legal suits for assault and battery, trespassing, and false 
imprisonment.80 These cases, unlike an outright freedom petition or a writ of habeas corpus, 
compelled legal officials to determine the filing party's enslaved or free status before the assault 
and battery, trespassing, or false imprisonment legal claims could go forward in court.81 Indirectly, 
then, these methods allowed illegally enslaved individuals to have courts determine their freedom 
status.  
Additional complexities existed in how slaves and free blacks could initiate their legal suits. 
Some states refused slaves and free blacks access to petition the courts independently. For 
example, Georgia required slaves to petition with a next of friend, or a white guardian.82 Also, in 
an 1820 legal act in Virginia, courts allowed slaves without funds to sue for free, in forma 
pauperis.83 Slaves and free blacks also took great risk in petitioning for their freedom. In some 
states like South Carolina and Georgia, laws enforced physical punishment to slaves as a result of 
an unsuccessful suit.84 
The above procedures and complexities that defined how slaves could petition for their 
freedom - directly or indirectly - were closely connected to the continuation and protection of white 
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male property rights in the US South.85 In In the Shadow of Dred Scott, Kelly Kennington explores 
some of legal officials' rationale behind statutes and codes that allowed slaves to file suit for their 
freedom in St. Louis and across the antebellum US South.86 She highlights broad practices, 
procedures, and ideologies involved in antebellum law regarding freedom-claiming. For example, 
Kennington demonstrates that many of these laws were rooted in white men's determination to 
protect their own freedom in connection to racial ideologies and, especially, in connection to the 
debate on slavery. For instance, if a white person assisted an enslaved petitioner as a lawyer, 
guardian, or other role, they sometimes faced financial fees if the suit was unsuccessful.87 This 
practice aimed to discourage white lawyers and anti-slavery and abolitionist advocates from 
assisting slaves' freedom petitions.88 Despite the procedural challenges accompanied with filing 
suit and gaining freedom in law, slaves in the antebellum US actively became litigants and made 
legal claims with the assistance of legal aid like lawyers who signed on their behalf and helped 
them create their legal narrative.  
Slaves' active engagement with the courts also reveals to a degree the type of legal 
consciousness they had regarding their rights to protect or gain their freedom in law. This thesis 
uses Kelly Kennington's definition of legal consciousness as ""individuals' view of law, their 
experience of the law, and the considerations they make when approaching the legal system for 
assistance."89  Slaves and free blacks became aware of their rights to gain or protect their freedom 
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through a combination of sources. For example, Kennington discusses the importance of 
community networks, shared knowledge, and local discussions in the antebellum South that likely 
contributed to slaves' awareness of how to create a successful petition, as well as what lawyers 
might represent them and the experiences of other enslaved individuals in the community in 
court.90  
Slaves and free blacks' legal consciousness of their rights in law grew and gained new 
information as a result of Atlantic movement, as well. Petitioners examined in this thesis often had 
experiences in Atlantic jurisdictions where they likely became aware of their rights in law in 
French, Iberian, and British law through, as Kennington discussed, community networks and 
shared knowledge. Also, slaves and free blacks' access to law and legal structures to gain or protect 
their freedom were important parts of Iberian legal culture and laws on slavery and freedom-
claiming were well-known in Cuba. As a result, petitioners in the US South who had been born in, 
spent time in, or passed through Iberian jurisdictions likely made legal decisions that were 
informed with and built from some Iberian ideas about legal justice and slavery as they went to 
court, in addition to other laws in French, British, and antebellum US jurisdictions. Indeed, slaves 
and free blacks coming from Atlantic territories likely had a degree of knowledge about their rights 
that were protected in law that they combined with antebellum US laws to petition for their 
freedom. 
Taken together, this section's examination of law, legal procedure, and legal consciousness in 
French Saint-Domingue, British Jamaica, Spanish Cuba, and the antebellum US South position 
the freedom petitions in this thesis in an interconnected Atlantic discourse. Legal constructs across 
Atlantic jurisdictions could be quite different across borders and informed slaves and free blacks 
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of their legal rights and connections to an empire in distinct ways. However, similar options existed 
across these jurisdictions, especially in Iberian and antebellum law, for slaves and free blacks to 
pursue or protect their freedom. As a result, slaves and free blacks were aware of their ability to 
access courts and their legal rights in law in similar ways that were connected across Atlantic 
jurisdictions. Also, the freedom petitions that this thesis examines in greater depth in the following 
chapters, and especially in relation to empire and subjecthood in law, reveal that, despite their 
distinct origins, slaves and free blacks from Jamaica, Saint-Domingue, Cuba, and more largely 
petitioned and created legal narratives in similar ways, as well. 
"From the Island of Santo Domingo in the Island of Cuba:" A Historical Review of the 
Interconnected Atlantic Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century 
In 1813 in New Orleans, Castor, an enslaved black man, petitioned the parish court of New 
Orleans for his freedom.91 He stated that the "late Francis Morin L'eveque inhabitant [...] of Sto 
[Santo] Domingo parish of [...] ... gave to him his freedom." Castor stated that in his master's last 
will and testament, Leveque promised a manumission clause that would liberate him. However, 
after Leveque died, Castor remained enslaved. 
He stated that "some time after the death of the said L'eveque," the executor of his will, 
"named Joseph Hollandais" died as well and, importantly, had not filed freedom clause. "Since 
this time your petitioner" resided under "the authority of a certain woman named Claire Leveque, 
free woman of color, his [Francis's] sister." Claire forced Castor to travel with her across the 
Caribbean later, likely fleeing the Haitian Revolution and its aftermath. Castor stated that she 
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"brought him from the island of Sto. [Santo] Domingo in the island of Cuba" and then "in this city 
of New Orleans." Castor went on and stated, "that the said Claire L'eveque enjoys...his work, 
without title...particularly since his arrival in this city." Further, he stated that she often "treated 
him severely" and "enjoyed the fruits of his labor" without any right. "With respect for the 
memory of his late master," Castor petitioned for his freedom. He also demanded that Claire be 
held accountable for the eighteen years she illegally held him as her slave and summoned to 
compensate him $1,500.00.  
Castor petitioned with a sense of urgency, as well. He stated that he feared that Claire "is 
in the intention to depart this state, willing to [...] all difficulty in claiming of his right." Eager to 
gain his freedom and reparations before Claire fled Louisiana, Castor told the court "he has 
recourse to your authority and ...that it may please to your honor to order that the named [...] 
Leveque be cited to appear in the usual delays" and "to answer this petition and do show case" for 
his enslavement. On October 12, the court partially granted Castor his petition filed in both 
English and French. 
Castor's freedom petition and its aftermath reveals some of the lived experiences of slaves 
and free blacks in historical events, political transformations, and movement and migration across 
the Atlantic in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, while he did not 
reference the Haitian Revolution in his narrative, it is likely that it played a role in his movement 
in the Caribbean. Based on his statement that Claire held him as her slave illegally for eighteen 
years, he would have been in French Saint-Domingue right around the time of the revolution. He 
likely witnessed the slave rebellion to some degree and it probably served as the main reason that 
Claire took him with her to Santiago de Cuba, a common destination for French refugees fleeing 
the island.  
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As this chapter has shown in previous sections, the Atlantic World and the Caribbean was 
an interconnected space where slaves and free blacks' lived experiences, as well as their access to 
law and legal constructs regarding slavery and freedom, had important shared similarities. To 
better understand these connections in slavery, freedom, and law in the Atlantic, it is important to 
develop and engage the historical context in which slaves and free blacks' lived experiences and 
law and legal processes were connected.  
Also, it is valuable to review some of the historical transformations in the Caribbean in the 
nineteenth century as many of the petitioners in this study articled their experiences in connection 
to historical changes taking place in the Atlantic. For example, many arrived in New Orleans as 
French refugees fleeing the Haitian Revolution and petitioners told courts stories about their 
experiences fleeing the island, their family members in Haiti who were free, and their service in 
the British black militias during the British army's occupation of the French island. The Haitian 
Revolution also had an important impact on the Atlantic African slave trade following the fall of 
the French government on the island and the rise of an independent Haitian republic that petitioners 
articulated in court. As the trans-Atlantic slave trade gained new connections in the Caribbean, 
namely to colonies like Cuba and Brazil, some petitioners described being kidnapped from slave 
ships traveling with African slaves onboard to Cuba and Brazil as part of the revived African slave 
trade with the island. 
In order to better contextualize the freedom petitions in this thesis and the changes that 
connected many of the petitioners, this section provides a historical framework that reflects many 
of their experiences in the Atlantic World. Castor's petition, as well as the eventual aftermath 
regarding Claire and her life in the Caribbean, connects to the lived experiences of many petitioners 
explored in this study and serves as fitting anecdote to begin to discuss historical connections in 
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the Atlantic Caribbean in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, namely through the development 
of French Saint-Domingue as a major export-based slave society, the Haitian Revolution, and 
subsequent changes in the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the Caribbean.  
Ultimately, petitioners like Castor crossed borders, participated in wars and revolutions, 
engaged trans-Atlantic trade patterns, and were aware of political exchanges. Their narratives in 
the Atlantic were broad, far-reaching, and interconnected to historical and political transformations 
in the Caribbean. In short, the historical transformations taking place in the Atlantic Caribbean in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - especially the Haitian Revolution and shifts in the trans-
Atlantic slave trade - reveal to a large degree the ways that the Atlantic World was an 
interconnected space articulated by slaves in their legal suits. 
Beginning in the French Caribbean, by the middle of the eighteenth century the imperial 
colony of Saint-Domingue was known for its violent and oppressive slave regime. With thousands 
of African slaves, the island produced the highest amount of sugar for export in the Atlantic and 
became the wealthiest island in the Caribbean.92 Sugar plantations required a high amount of 
investment and planning, such as through irrigation planning through the island.93 Not least of all, 
they also required intensive labor. In 1752, Saint-Domingue had roughly 161,000 slaves on the 
island.94 To produce such high amounts of exported sugar, planters and slaveowners in Saint-
Domingue enacted a violent plantation system over the slave population. 
By 1791, the slave society in Saint-Domingue became unsustainable and slaves across the 
island rose up in rebellion to overthrow the violent and repressive plantation system, spurring what 
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would be the first successful slave rebellion in the Americas. The Haitian Revolution, eventually 
led by Toussaint Louverture, swept the island as former slaves and free blacks burned sugar fields, 
challenged the planter elite, and grew in numbers of the thousands. During the span of the 
revolution, the British occupied the island for a time to claim it as their own, former slaves and 
free blacks rose to military and political prestige such as Toussaint Louverture and Jorge Biassou, 
and the French crown abolished slavery in metropolitan assembly decrees.95 Despite advances 
from Atlantic empires and France's grasps to maintain control over the island, in 1804 the Haitian 
Revolution succeeded as former slaves gained their freedom and declared the new republic of 
Haiti. In response, scores of former slaveholders fled to nearby Cuba and Louisiana for refuge.96 
Thousands of slaveholders and those seeking to flee the Haitian Revolution initially settled in 
Cuba in the nearby area of Santiago de Cuba. Soon after in 1809, the French refugees in Cuba 
were expelled as Napoleon invaded Spain and the Spanish and French empires entered war. Spain's 
provisional government declared the expulsion of all French subjects from Spanish territories. 
Forced to flee again, thousands of French refugees migrated to formerly-French controlled territory 
New Orleans and the broader area of Louisiana.97  
Following the collapse of the French colony and the success of the Haitian Revolution, a 
vacuum emerged in the Caribbean for an imperial colony to take Saint-Domingue's place as the 
top-producer of exported sugar. The Spanish empire aimed at imitating Saint-Domingue's prior 
success and profitability in their colonial holding in Cuba. Until the nineteenth century, Cuba was 
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a relatively small Spanish settlement and port colony focused on small-scale agricultural 
production. However, after the Haitian Revolution, slaveholders transformed the island to an 
export-based system with sugar and coffee plantations mirrored after English and French models 
in Jamaica and former Saint-Domingue.98 Aiming at taking the previous place of Saint-Domingue 
as the wealthiest and highest producing export-crop colony, Cuban slaveholders propelled the 
island into a slave society with a reignited connection to direct-African slave trading often referred 
to by scholars as the island's "second slavery."  
Despite significant changes in Cuba characterized with extreme harshness in slave life on 
plantations and heightened racism in the nineteenth century, free black society in Cuba continued 
to be vibrant and diverse, and occupied a continued space in society. Because of Cuba's history as 
a relatively small settlement and port colony, free blacks had prominent roles as settlers and 
artisans in communities since the fifteenth century.99 Because of their foundation in Cuban society, 
free blacks were able to access protected privileges in law, maintain their freedom to a limited 
degree, and occupy important positions in societies, in particular as a large group of free black 
artisans.100 
Returning to the beginning of this section, Castor's petition and his testimony reflected many 
of the above explored historical transformations like slavery in French-Saint-Domingue, the 
Haitian Revolution, and refugee migrations. It is useful to look beyond Castor's freedom petition, 
as well, and at Claire' lived experiences to see additional historical events and changes. For 
example, legal records in Cuba reflect Claire and her family's lived experiences in the Caribbean 
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after Castor's freedom suit and serve as a fitting conclusion for the historical context of the lived 
experiences of French refugees following the Haitian Revolution, free black women in Cuba, and 
Atlantic slaveholding.  
In his freedom petition, Castor told the New Orleans parish court that he feared Claire would 
soon "depart the state" since she could not prove title or claim to hold him as her slave, and he was 
right. Apparently, Claire did just that and returned to Cuba after Castor's petition. In 1827, Claire 
Leveque was referenced in a legal document in the Audiencia de Santiago de Cuba, the colony's 
high court.101 She was listed as "la francesa, Clara Leveque," or the French Claire Leveque. The 
legal record was filed by her sobrinos, or nieces and nephews, Jose Marissie, Carlotta Leveque, 
and Ana Maria Leveque, in Puerto Principe. The purpose of the legal file was the topic of Claire's 
recent death and the distribution of her property. Apparently, Claire had "passed away in the part 
of Santa Catalina in the jurisdiction of the city of Cuba.102"  
 Her sobrinos, Jose, Carlotta, and Ana Maria, also previously from Saint-Domingue, filed suit 
to obtain her property through familial inheritance following her death, "demonstrating to be alone 
the relatives who left to the deceased, to be declared universal heirs.103" They also stated their 
connection to Claire: " the other two nieces named Carlota, and Ana Maria daughters of Carolina 
Leveque, both sisters of the [...] Clara.104"  
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In their petition to the Audiencia de Santiago de Cuba, Jose, Carlotta, and Ana Maria 
referenced Claire's former belonging in French Saint-Domingue and the legal case identified her 
as a "native who was from the French part of Santo Domingo." Further, the nieces and nephew 
referenced the siete partidas, a set of imperial legal codes for Spanish colonies grounded in Roman 
canon.105 They invoked laws that stated, "that one dying [...] without testament ascendants or 
descendants, but if nephews [...] two brothers, either on the part of a father, or of a mother, and 
those who were killed, the nephews will inherit from the uncle or aunt....106" 
Jose Marissie, Carlota Leveque, and Ana Maria Leveques' claims in a Spanish high court to be 
recognized as Claire's legitimate heirs reflects historical themes of free black society in Cuba and 
specifically of free women, Iberian laws, and some of the lived experiences of French refugees 
migrating across the Caribbean. For example, in New Orleans, Claire was listed as a free woman 
of color in Castor's freedom suit and when she returned to Cuba after Castor's petition she likely 
entered Cuba's community of property holding free blacks, likely becoming herself a vecina. To 
be a 'vecino' or 'vecina,' one was an established member of a community, and often property 
holding.107 Further, 'vecinidad' typically conferred certain rights and privileges to the members, 
often being comparable to the term 'citizen,' although not formally recognized by the crown on 
those terms.108  Further, she and her nieces and nephews' experiences in law highlight the lived 
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experiences of French refugees from Saint-Domingue in the Atlantic Caribbean. For example, 
Claire's family's claims in court reveal that former French subjects litigated for property and family 
inheritances across Atlantic borders and navigated Spanish imperial law. 
Ultimately, petitions like Castor's and the experiences of Claire's reimmigration to Cuba reflect 
large historical contexts and patterns seen in many petitions in this study. Many of the petitioners 
in the antebellum US South from across the Atlantic World had interconnected experiences of 
movement alongside the historical transformations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
the Caribbean like the Haitian Revolution and shifts in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. In later 
chapters, this thesis explores narratives like Castor's in more depth where petitioners told legal 
officials about their lived experiences in the Atlantic in this historical context in order to create 
testimonies about their identities as free persons in close connection to historical, economic, and 
political changes in the nineteenth century Caribbean. 
"The Peaceful and Lawful Enjoyment of his Freedom:" Conclusion on the Interconnected 
Atlantic World 
In 1821, Antonio Saya Llado petitioned the First District Court of New Orleans for his 
freedom.109 A recently freed slave from Cuba, Saya Llado told legal officials that he was 
emancipated in 1819 in Puerto Principe by his master Don Pedro Nicolás Saya. After he gained 
his freedom, Saya stated that he was in “the peaceful and lawful enjoyment of his freedom” and 
said that he obtained an “honest livelihood.” 
Saya Llado was “in the peaceable and lawful enjoyment of his freedom” in 1819 and stated 
that he worked along the coast on the southern part of Cuba. He told legal officials that while he 
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was working along the coast, he was kidnapped and “forcibly and violently hurried off” by pirates. 
Following his capture, he stated that he was taken by a corsair through the Caribbean to a French 
pirate den in Barataria Bay and, afterwards, New Orleans. Saya alleged that the owner of the pirate 
ship was a man named Alexander Livorgne and, from the moment of his illegal capture, Saya 
claimed that Livorgne maintained him as a slave in New Orleans “without any color of authority 
or right.” 
Saya narrated this story of his experiences in slavery, emancipation from his master, 
freedom, and kidnapping in Cuba and the Atlantic World with the assistance of an attorney. He 
asked legal officials to honor his freedom and grant him “the enjoyment of his freedom” and 
requested the court that he “may be taken under the protection” of police custody for the duration 
of his petition for his protection. At the end of his petition, he signed his name, revealing that he 
was likely literate or at least able to write or sign his name.  
Antonio Saya Llado's freedom petition joins the other cases in this chapter to demonstrate 
some of the important ways that the Atlantic World was an interconnected space. With similarities 
that match the petitions from Joseph Antoine, Antonio Muray, and Castor, Saya Llado presented 
the court with a narrative that described his experiences in freedom, illegal slavery, kidnapping 
and displacement, and more. Importantly, he petitioned as the others to the lower court of New 
Orleans and made a compelling narrative that wove Iberian colonies and emancipation practices, 
illicit slavery and French piracy, and antebellum US law to gain his freedom. 
This chapter has demonstrated that while at first these cases may seem disparate, they in 
fact present an important panorama of slavery and freedom-claiming across the nineteenth-century 
Atlantic World. Indeed, the cases in this chapter and throughout this thesis are distinct and the 
petitioners presented unique lived experiences across the Caribbean. For example, after moving 
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from Cuba to Virginia, Joseph Antoine became enslaved by his wife's coercive master and accused 
of being a fugitive slave. Muray traveled across the Spanish and British Caribbean and was forced 
into indentured servitude that turned into slavery. Castor had been illegally enslaved by his former 
master's sister and denied the promise of emancipation. Finally, Antonio Saya Llado endured 
kidnapping from French pirates following his emancipation in Cuba. While the petitioners 
presented unique narratives of life in freedom and enslavement across the Caribbean from Iberian, 
French, and British jurisdictions, much connects them when viewed together. They all traveled 
similar courses across the Caribbean, ended up in the antebellum US South, and attempted to gain 
their freedom from illegal enslavement in courts. 
Overall, in viewing these cases together it becomes increasingly clear that litigants from 
across the Atlantic World presented important ideas about the Atlantic World in interrelated terms. 
Scholars have grappled with the ways that the Americas occupied a shared Atlantic space, the 
ways that laws and customs had shared similarities, and the rippling connections of historical 
transformations across Atlantic, such as in the Haitian Revolution and the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade. Law and legal processes for slaves and free blacks to pursue and protect their freedom 
presented an especially interesting connection in the Atlantic, as well. French, British, Iberian, and 
antebellum laws on race, slavery, and freedom certainly differed and created harsh restrictions and 
challenges for slaves and free blacks. Despite these differences and restrictions, Atlantic 
jurisdictions also had some laws, regulations, and legal procedures connected to slavery and 
freedom that slaves and free blacks strategically used to gain or protect their freedom. For example, 
especially in Iberian and antebellum jurisdictions, some opportunities existed in law for slaves to 
escape slavery like coartacion, pedir papel, freedom suits, and more. While they had different 
options, as well as difficulties and challenges, for pursuing legal recourse, there existed some 
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opportunities to use the law in different ways to gain or protect their freedom. As a result, slaves 
and free blacks were savvy litigants who strategically used and manipulated these laws to gain 
their freedom. Further, the connections among law and legal procedure for freedom-claiming in 
Iberian and antebellum law suggest that slaves and free blacks engaged in and were a part of a 
broad Atlantic legal consciousness regarding their abilities to use the law to escape slavery and 
improve their lives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
"BELONGING TO THE DOMINION OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY:" NARRATIVES OF 
IDENTITY, EMPIRE, AND SUBJECTHOOD IN FREEDOM CLAIMS 
In 1861, John Kelker and his family petitioned the Florida Assembly to recognize and 
safeguard their freedoms.110 To begin their petition, Kelker and his family stated that they were 
"inhabitants of Santa Rosa County," and "free persons of color, natives of West Florida, and all 
born anterior to the treaty of [cession] with Spain. " One member of their family, Cecil Kelker, 
was not born prior to "the treaty with Spain," the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819 under which Florida 
became a United States territory and ceded from Spain.111 John Kelker stated that, although Cecil 
was not born under the Spanish empire in Florida, she was "the daughter of parents, subjects of 
Spain, and residents of West Florida at the date of the treaty." Since the ratification of the treaty 
and Florida's change in jurisdiction, Kelker and his family stated that "they have been continuously 
in Florida at all times, and have conducted themselves at all times as peaceable, sober, and 
industrious persons abiding the laws and performing all the duties imposed by the laws."  
Kelker and his family had been attuned to American laws and recent legislative 
developments in Florida. In their petition, they stated that they knew "at the last session of your 
honorable body an act was passed relieving and exempting certain persons therein named being 
persons of color, of the city of Pensacola, from the restriction and penalties imposed upon them 
and persons of their class by several laws of the State of Florida. " Knowledgeable about recent 
legal precedents offering protection for free blacks, they stated that "the reasons of the act [by the 
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assembly was] that they were subjects of the King of Spain anterior to the date of the treaty of 
[cession] with that nation." Seeking a similar exemption from restrictive laws against free blacks 
in Florida, John Kelker and his family asked the Florida legislature to honor their claims as both 
free persons and former Spanish subjects.  
John Kelker and his family petitioned the State of Florida at a tumultuous time. In 1861, 
slave states in the antebellum American South seceded from the United States in response to the 
growing debate over the continuation of slavery in the westward expansion of antebellum America. 
After seceding from the federal union, southern states created the Confederate States of America, 
a slaveholding republic committed to the continuation of slavery and the subordination of slaves 
and free blacks in law and society. Wasting no time, officials in Florida did the same in February 
1861 and became the third state to join the Confederacy. In that same year, the Florida Assembly 
referred Kelker's case to a select committee and Kelker and his family ultimately gained approval 
for their request in November. Indeed, the Florida legislature - as well as Kelker, his family, and 
his witnesses - considered Spanish imperial subjecthood a continued status that despite territorial 
and jurisdictional changes, continued to confer rights to freedom.112 
Kelker and his family's petition is telling and presents a perhaps surprising juxtaposition 
between the American Civil War and Atlantic imperial authority. In 1861, it had been forty years 
since the Spanish cession of Florida and the state was certainly well-within the fold of the 
American republic. In 1861, the antebellum US entered into Civil War and Florida joined scores 
of southern states in declaring a commitment to slavery through the creation of the confederacy. 
In fact, written directly above the select committee's decision in favor of John Kelker and his 
family's petition in the 1861 General Acts, Resolutions, and Memorials Adopted by the Legislature 
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of Florida, legal officials wrote a financial provision for wartime expenses.113 In it, officials 
devoted "$1,649.63 for military purposes, including the arming, equipping and clothing for 
volunteers, on account of and since the secession of the State of Florida from the old Federal 
Union, $500,00."114 
While Florida joined the growing debate in favor for slavery in America, however, Spanish 
imperial authority and subjecthood were still invoked in the state and in law. Although it was no 
longer a Spanish territory, John Kelker and his family, as well as other free black former Spanish 
subjects, brought ideas of the Spanish empire, imperial subjecthood, and colonial authority into 
the antebellum US debate on slavery and freedom during the Civil War. Despite the tumult of the 
quickly developing war, petitioners like John Kelker claimed continued imperial subjecthood and 
aligned themselves with the Spanish empire to protect their freedom. In short, their petition 
brought the Spanish empire and colonial subjecthood to the fore of freedom-claiming in the Florida 
State Assembly. 
Kelker's petition and others like it raise many questions. For one, the cases seem to suggest 
that Atlantic empires occupied a contested space in the Americas as territories and jurisdictions 
shifted due to conflict, land exchanges, or war and revolution. A central question to this chapter, 
then, is where did empires exist and have authority? This question makes John Kelker and his 
petition to safeguard his family's freedom somewhat complicated. He appealed to the Florida State 
Assembly to protect their freedom, but on the ground of Spanish imperial subjecthood. 
Subjecthood, defined in this thesis as a vertical relationship between an individual and sovereign 
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that ensured certain protections from an empire to a loyal individual, is at work in Kelker's 
petition.115 Therefore, to add to the question about where an empire and its power and authority 
can exist, could empires and the relationship between a sovereign still have power and meaning in 
former territories or wholly different jurisdictions? In other words, what allowed Kelker and his 
family to assert their freedom by the authority and protection granted to them as former imperial 
subjects of the Spanish crown?  
Another important string of questions that speak to legal narratives and story-telling: how 
did Kelker, his family, and community members envision and articulate their identities in relation 
to the Spanish empire? Kelker and his family asserted their freedom on the grounds that they were 
Spanish subjects. Did they envision subjecthood as a persistent and uninfringeable right and, that 
no matter what space they occupied, it was valid? Further, that despite jurisdictional or territorial 
changes, their rights as not only free persons, but persons aligned with and subject to the Spanish 
crown were continuous no matter what jurisdiction they lived under? Recall that Kelker and his 
family petitioned for protection of their freedom nearly forty years after the Spanish cession of 
Florida. Therefore, after decades, did they continue to see themselves as members of the Spanish 
empire and loyal subjects?  
This chapter explores the above questions by examining the ways that petitioners narrated 
their claims at court and how they presented their identities as free persons. Most importantly, they 
emphasized to legal officials that they were free persons. For example, they centered their petitions 
on the fact that they were originally or previously free in Atlantic jurisdictions. Some told legal 
officials that they were born free from free parents. Others stated that they had been legally 
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emancipated or manumitted by former owners. Also, others insisted that they could prove their 
free status with legal papers. 
To support their claims to freedom, petitioners also created narratives that reflected their 
experiences and identities as free persons. By telling narratives about their lives as free persons 
they sought to convince court officials that they were truly free in connection to their legal claims 
for freedom. Like John Kelker and his family, petitioners stated that they had been longtime 
residences of certain areas as free persons and known by community members as free. In other 
petitions, they emphasized their connection to free ancestry and kinship ties, free movement and 
mobility across the Caribbean and Atlantic, or free work as skilled artisans. Most important, 
petitioners created narratives that best suited their legal interests which would emphasize that they 
had numerous experiences as free persons in order to support their legal claims. 
Another way that petitioners often described their experiences and identities as free persons 
was by telling courts about their connections to empires and subjecthood in the Atlantic.  
Petitioners like John Kelker and many more stated, for example, that they belonged to Atlantic 
sovereignties and were subjects to kings. In all the petitions examined in this thesis, petitioners 
articulated their identities as free persons in close connection to their membership to Atlantic 
empires 
Narratives referencing Atlantic empires and subjecthood suggest that petitioners' imperial 
identities served an important role for litigants to articulate their status as free persons. This chapter 
examines the role and importance of empire and subjecthood in petitioners' narrative testimonies. 
It looks at where and with what empires in the Atlantic World petitioners aligned themselves in 
their narratives, typically powerful Atlantic authorities like the Spanish, British, and French. 
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Further, petitioners also asserted their status within empires, particularly as free persons and, 
sometimes, as subjects.  
Indeed, petitioners' consistent use of imperial rhetoric and language in their legal claims 
for freedom suggest that articulating their membership to an Atlantic empire was vital for them to 
tell courts and include in their narratives. However, as discussed in this thesis' introduction and 
first chapter, legal officials were primarily concerned with whether slaves could prove that they 
were free - through freedom papers or community support, for example. In other words, officials 
in local courts in the antebellum US South rarely adjudicated freedom suits based on imperial 
loyalties or subjecthood status. Why, then, did petitioners continually reference their or their 
family's connection to Atlantic empires if it served little legal strategy in asserting their freedom 
in law? 
Ultimately, while to what empires petitioners belonged counted for little to legal officials 
in deciding their freedom in court, it mattered a great deal to petitioners. Their identities as 
members in an empire or loyal subjects to a king were closely connected to their identities as free 
persons, as well. Petitioners, therefore, articulated their connection to empires to show legal 
officials that they had been free persons. For example, they connected themselves to imperial 
metropoles in Europe and sovereign figures of kings. They also asserted themselves as imperial 
subjects. Finally, they also connected themselves to empires through ancestry. In short, petitioners' 
identities as free persons were intimately connected to their identities as members of an empire 
and they articulated their imperial connections to sovereigns as yet another way to demonstrate to 
legal officials that they had been free persons. 
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"Deprived during Eighteen Years of his Freedom:" Imperial Belonging in Legal Narratives 
On August 4, 1818, José Gelar appeared before the Superior Court of Oakmulge Circuit in 
Twiggs County, Georgia and filed a writ of habeas corpus to secure his freedom.116 In Gelar's case, 
his accusations were far-reaching and spanned the antebellum US South, the Atlantic Caribbean, 
and the Spanish empire. Gelar told the court that he was "a native of the island of Cuba." To be 
more specific, Gelar clarified that Cuba was "belonging to the dominion of his Catholic Majesty 
the King of Spain" and he stated that he was "by birth a freeman." Further, he invoked race 
alongside his claim for freedom, asserting that he was "not of that description of persons, called in 
the United States persons of colour." 
Gelar went on and stated that he had been "taken by persons claiming to be from the United 
States," "claimed, and disposed of by the said citizens as a slave," and that he was "deprived of his 
liberty in the capacity of a slave by one Samuel P. Hargrow of the county of Twiggs [in Georgia]." 
Gelar concluded his petition with the assistance of an attorney, Moses Fort, and asked the judge 
"to grant the writ of habeas corpus directed to the said Samuel requiring him to show cause" for 
his enslavement.  
Judge Christopher Strong evaluated Gelar's case and summoned Hargrow to appear before the 
court. In his summons, Judge Strong reiterated José Gelar's accusations against Hargrow and stated 
that "it has been represented to me that you have in your custody a José Gelar," who he described 
as "a freeman and late an inhabitant and citizen of his Catholic majesty the King of Spain's 
dominion." He stated that "you claim and hold the said José to service in the capacity of a slave" 
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and referenced Gelar's request for a writ of habeas corpus "requiring you to show cause for such 
detention." Finally, Judge Strong "commanded that [Hargrow] bring the body of the said José 
before the Superior Court now in session by tomorrow morning nine o'clock" where the 
accusations and any evidence would be considered. 
The next day Hargrow appeared with proof of ownership over Gelar, however, it did not 
convince the judge. Hargrow stated that he had a "bill of sale from [...] H. Moreland, dated 2nd. 
Feby. [February] 1816." Nevertheless, the bill of sale did not convince Judge Strong and he 
dismissed Hargrow's claim to Gelar. In his comments, Strong stated that "Gelar is a free person of 
color" and that he "ordered that the said José Gelar be discharged accordingly." 
Gelar's petition serves as a useful case to examine the ways that slaves and free blacks formed 
strategic legal narratives as they went to court to petition for their freedom. Most important in his 
narrative, Gelar emphasized that he was a free man. For example, he stated that he was a free 
person from Cuba and "by birth a freeman." In addition to his claims that he was a free man and 
born free in Cuba, Gelar provided interesting narrative testimony to the court about his experiences 
and identity as a free person. For example, he stated that he was "not of that description of persons, 
called in the United States persons of colour." 
Another important way that Gelar articulated his identity as a free man was by situating himself 
as a member of the Spanish empire and, moreover, connected to Iberian imperial and metropolitan 
authority. For example, while his origin in Cuba was important in order for Gelar to articulate 
where he was from, he ultimately aligned his identity as a free man beyond the colonial island. He 
pointed out in his petition that he was not only from Cuba, but that Cuba and himself belonged "to 
the dominion of his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain." In his case for freedom, Gelar 
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strategically invoked Spain's imperial metropole in Europe and the figure of the king to articulate 
his identity as a free man. 
Gelar's case serves as a fitting lens through which to examine slaves and free blacks' imperial 
identities in the Atlantic World. When litigants like John Kelker and José Gelar petitioned for 
freedom and made connections between themselves and the Spanish empire and the king of Spain, 
they often did not do so in reference to colonial territories or authorities. While they likely had 
most familiarity with local authorities, colonies often changed hands unexpectedly due to war, 
revolution, or territorial exchanges. Rather, in cases like John Kelker and José Gelar's, their 
identities as members of Atlantic empires were most connected to the imperial metropole in 
Europe, and their relationship to a sovereign figure like a king was important.  
Slaves and free blacks had many reasons to identify themselves within an empire more closely 
with imperial metropoles rather than colonial jurisdictions. For example, although the metropole 
was perhaps less familiar to them than their local colonial surroundings, colonial territories and 
authorities were often in flux and constantly changed hands. Territories shifted powers because of 
war, revolution, or political treaties. Also, authorities moved in and out of colonial positions and 
uncertainty characterized much of colonial authority in the Caribbean with shifting political 
alliances, piracy, and trade patterns. As a result of colonial changes and uncertainties in the 
Atlantic, the imperial metropole presented a more stable institution to identify oneself and make 
claims.117  
In addition, slaves and free blacks' relationship to imperial authority at the metropole and their 
roles as subjects in the Spanish empire was connected to a long historical tradition. In Iberian legal 
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traditions, free blacks loyal to the empire were recognized as legitimate subjects and legal persons. 
They often invoked their loyalty to the crown and the reciprocal and vertical relationship of 
subjecthood they enjoyed between themselves as subjects and the distant monarch.118 This thesis 
defines imperial subjecthood as the vertical relationship between an individual and a sovereign 
authority wherein individuals pledged loyalty to an empire in exchange for imperial protections 
and obligations to them as subjects.119 Free blacks often strategically used this relationship and 
made legal petitions and royal requests to imperial authorities.120 Under these relationships, 
imperial authorities and laws provided slaves and free blacks opportunities to gain their freedom, 
recognize their military service to the crown, or seek legal recourse through royal petitions. As a 
result, the metropole and the figure of the king, the height of imperial authority, played an 
important role for where litigants understood and connected their identities as free persons and 
members of Atlantic empires.   
The importance of empire and subjecthood for slaves and free blacks' identities as free persons 
were important beyond Iberian jurisdictions, as well. In petitions by slaves and free blacks from 
French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica, for example, litigants used strategies that aligned 
their freedom with imperial powers and a reciprocal relationship between an individual and 
sovereign, too. For example, imperial connections to slaves' identities as free persons featured 
prominently in Zephir's petition in antebellum Louisiana. Zephir, a black man, petitioned the New 
Orleans parish court in April 1819 for his freedom from Simon Gallien Preval.121 Zephir testified 
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that he was originally enslaved to Preval in French Saint-Domingue in the late eighteenth century, 
specifically in Saint Marc on the western side of the island. However, Zephir stated that, although 
Preval once held him as a slave, Preval no longer had any right to him because he sold him. In fact, 
Preval sold Zephir in 1794 to the British military during their invasion and occupation of the island 
during the Haitian Revolution.  
Zephir provided a detailed account of his service with the British army during their 
invasion and occupation of the island in his testimony. He stated that “when that island was 
invaded by a British army under General White,” military officials “organized a regiment of blacks 
in the British service, offered a sum of $400.00 for each slave to such planters and others,” and 
offered certificates to planters for having their slaves serve with the British. When the British 
invaded and occupied Saint-Domingue in 1794, 60% of their troops died, mostly due to yellow 
fever.122 In order to make up for a lack of healthy troops, the British recruited black regiments to 
serve in their army. Zephir stated that Preval “availed himself of the offer,” received $400.00, and 
relinquished ownership over him.  
In 1794, Zephir was no longer Preval's slave, though not yet free. Following Preval's 
transaction with the British military, Zephir became a black militiaman in the British army. In fact, 
he was quite successful in the regiment and became a skilled grenadier. He stated that the regiment 
travelled across the western side of the island and served in St. Marc, Mole-St. Nicolas, and “Grand 
Anse in the plaine de St. Jeremie.” During his service, Zephir was a skilled and widely-
knowledgeable soldier. 
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In 1798, Zephir stated that the regiment was disbanded “according to the capitulation made 
between General McClaine and Toussaint Louverture.” Zephir went on: “another order was 
published proclaiming free all persons of color and negroe slaves who had served under the British 
flag.” The order also promised the newly freed slaves that “they would be sent at the expense of 
the British government to their respective districts to enjoy their freedom.” Declared a free man, 
Zephir intended to “return to St. Marc” to “enjoy his freedom.”  
Unfortunately, Zephir did not return to St. Marc. His former master, Simon Gallien Preval, 
happened to be in Jeremie at the same time when the British disbanded the black regiments. 
According to Zephir, Preval found him and “induced him on various pretenses to remain with him 
and not to return to St. Marc.” Zephir, “finding himself in the impossibility of opposing such unjust 
treatment, was obliged to comply.” Since then, Zephir testified that Preval “treated him as a slave 
and exercised over him every right of ownership.”  
Coerced to remain with Preval, Zephir left the island with his former master “when the 
French evacuated Saint Domingue” and noted in his testimony that Preval “embarked [Zephir] as 
his slave and property, and sailed for St. Yago [Santiago] de Cuba.” Zephir stated that they 
“remained many years” in Cuba, but fled again later in response to “the declaration of war between 
France and Spain.” According to Zephir, “the French refugees from Saint Domingue were 
compelled to quit…all the Spanish possession in America.” Upon the French expulsion from Cuba, 
Preval took Zephir to New Orleans where he continued to hold him as a slave.  
Zephir made a convincing appeal to the parish court of New Orleans. He complained to the 
court that “in this place, as well in St. Yago [Santiago] and Jeremie,” Preval “continued to exercise 
every right of ownership” over him. He told the court that he “cannot support longer to be deprived 
of the enjoyment of his freedom.” Zephir asked the court to call upon Preval to answer to the 
64 
 
claims against him, grant his freedom, and “condemn [Preval] to pay [Zephir] a sum of four 
thousand dollars as damages sustained…for having been deprived during eighteen years of his 
freedom.” He also claimed that he had his certificate of freedom issued by the British and witnesses 
to vouch for his claims, stating that he would “be able to prove by the testimony of various 
witnesses all the material facts in this petition.”  
Unfortunately, Zephir was never able to call upon witnesses to testify on his behalf because 
the court denied his petition in December 1819. Despite the court's dismissal of his case, Zephir's 
experiences and legal narrative reveals valuable information about slavery in the Caribbean, slaves 
gaining freedom by serving with black militias in foreign militaries, and historical developments 
in the Atlantic. For example, Zephir petitioned the court with first-hand experience in military 
affairs. He spoke knowledgeably about specific developments, events, places, and figures in the 
Haitian Revolution and the British occupation of the island. He described imperial and 
international events involving the capitulation between the British and Haitian Revolution leader 
Toussaint Louverture which led to the end of the British occupation, and the many places he served 
as a grenadier with the black militia. 
Further, his testimony reflects experiences of enslaved Africans in black militias in the 
Caribbean and how ordinary slaves gained their freedom through service. Across the Atlantic 
World, service in black militias was one way that slaves gained their freedom and degrees of social 
mobility and prestige.123 As evidenced through Zephir’s experiences, he became a skilled member 
of the British black militia as a grenadier.  
These above examples also illustrate the ways that petitioners told legal officials narratives 
about their identities as free individuals. Zephir articulated how he earned and gained his freedom 
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- namely through skilled military service. Also, he told the court that he was a free person because 
of a British royal decree, had official freedom papers to support his claims, and could call upon 
community support to attest to his status as free man. 
Further, just as John Kelker and José Gelar articulated their identities as free persons in 
connection to their experiences in and relationships to Atlantic empires, Zephir likewise connected 
his identity as a free man to British imperial authority during their military invasion in Saint-
Domingue. For example, Zephir explained his freedom in connection to British imperial decrees 
and service. To him, there was no question that the British decree that liberated all soldiers in black 
militias should be legally binding across imperial and national borders - including Haiti, Cuba, and 
Louisiana. Zephir articulated himself and his identity as a free person as legally protected by 
British imperial freedom decrees and law, and positioned his freedom in terms of obligation and 
reciprocity among empires in the Atlantic World. Overall, he stated that his freedom was a right 
that was generated, bounded, and protected under the British empire and expected laws across 
jurisdictional borders to protect it. 
Taken together, Zephir's case, as well as John Kelker and José Gelar's, reflect some of the 
ways that petitioners articulated their identities as free persons in close connection Atlantic 
empires. Gelar connected his status and identity as a free man to the Spanish imperial metropole 
and articulated that he belonged to "the dominion of his Catholic majesty the King of Spain." 
Zephir stated that his identity as a free man was bounded and protected by the British empire and 
imperial decrees granted by military forces in Saint-Domingue. While their cases had different 
outcomes - Gelar were approved and Zephir was denied -  their narratives reflect the ways that 
slaves and free blacks articulated and defined their identities as free persons in close connection to 
Atlantic empires. 
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"Where your Petitioner Settled and Became a Citizen:" Subjecthood and Citizenship in the 
British Atlantic World 
On July 7, 1837, Samuel Bryan asked the Criminal Court of the State of Mississippi in 
Warren County for a writ of habeas corpus.124 Bryan petitioned the criminal court because he 
sought not only his freedom, but also to be released from jail. He stated that "he is confined as a 
runaway slave," but that "on the contrary...he is a free man and not a slave as alleged." He went 
on and stated that he "is a free man, that he was born of free parents in the town of Kingston in the 
Isle and of Jamaica & that he was born a subject of the King of Great Britain."  
Bryan discussed his life in Jamaica and stated that "at thirteen years he was apprenticed to 
[...] James Johnson [...] to learn the trade of being a carpenter." He stated that he continued to work 
with Johnson for five years until Johnson died, after which Bryan worked as an assistant cook on 
ships and went "onboard a brig in the Harbour of Kingston bound to New York in the United States 
of America...where your petitioner settled and became a citizen." From there, Bryan continued to 
work as a cook "on various vessels sailing from New York to different ports in the United States 
to Savanah in Georgia and Charleston, South Carolina" as well as "to Liverpool in England." In 
short, Bryan's work as a ship cook took him well across the Atlantic World. 
On a trip to New Orleans, Bryan left his ship without his freedom papers and was forced 
to travel back to New York along "Mississippi and Ohio to Pittsburgh...by land to New York." 
However, the "captain of the boat on which he embarked...on finding [Bryan] had no certificate of 
freedom...committed [him]" to the jail as a runaway slave. In July, after hearing Bryan's testimony, 
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as well as that of witnesses, the court granted Bryan's request, released him from jail, and 
recognized his freedom.125 
Samuel Bryan presented a compelling case and emphasized his status as a free man. For 
example, he told the court that he was a free man by birth and "born of free parents in the town of 
Kingston in the Isle and of Jamaica." Also, he created a narrative in which he described his 
experiences living as a free man, such being a skilled laborer who had been trained as an apprentice 
and who was well-traveled as a sailor and cook. 
Like the other petitions explored in this chapter, Bryan also articulated his identity as a free 
man in close connection to his connection to an Atlantic empire. In his testimony he created a 
direct link between himself and the British empire, and stated that he was "born a subject of the 
King of Great Britain." By doing so, Bryan situated his identity as a free man in connection to 
imperial subjecthood. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, this thesis defines imperial 
subjecthood as the vertical relationship between an individual and a sovereign authority wherein 
individuals pledged loyalty to an empire in exchange for imperial protections and obligations to 
them as subjects. Therefore, Bryan envisioned his former identity within the British empire (former 
because he stated that he eventually resettled and became a US citizen) as connected to royal 
protections and obligations. By creating a link to the British empire and, importantly, the king, as 
an imperial subject, Bryan characterized his identity as a free man in imperial terms. Ultimately, 
Bryan's case demonstrates one of the ways that freedom-claiming was closely connected to 
petitioners' identities within Atlantic empires and as loyal subjects.  
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Bryan's narrative also reflects the ways that freedom-claiming sometimes served as a 
platform to assert the legal and political recognition associated subjecthood and citizenship for 
slaves and free blacks. For example, Bryan's claims to freedom reached beyond his status as an 
imperial subject as he also closely aligned himself as a current citizen of the United States. He 
stated that he was "born a subject of the King of Great Britain," but after he began to work as a 
ship cook he "settled and became a citizen" in New York. Also, recall José Gelar's case from 
section one. In Judge Strong's comments, he characterized Gelar as "a freeman, and late an 
inhabitant and citizen of the King of Spain.126" 
Unlike subjecthood, citizenship functioned on the basis of a horizontal reciprocal 
relationship between an individual and nation.127 Citizenship in the United States - as well as other 
emerging republics in the mid-late nineteenth-century Atlantic World such as Argentina and Brazil 
- was largely exclusive to white, property-holding males. Women, free blacks, slaves, and minors 
faced restrictions and exclusions to participating in the polity as citizens, for example through 
restrictions to own property, racial segregation laws, and denial of legal personhood in many areas 
of the law. Litigants like Bryan and Gelar who articulated their identities as free persons in 
connection to subjecthood and citizenship place their freedom petitions in a larger history that 
examines slaves and free blacks' efforts to gain legal and political recognition as subjects and 
citizens. These freedom petitions can be seen as not only legal claims for liberty, then, but also as 
efforts by slaves and free blacks to be recognized as subjects and citizens. 
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Ultimately, while they did not use the language of citizenship or subjecthood in all of their 
cases, petitioners attempted to align their identities as free persons with their experiences 
associated with membership within an empire or republic. In Gelar and Bryan's petitions, they 
articulated and asserted their identities as subjects and sometimes as citizens. Overall, these cases 
reveal that as petitioners like Gelar, Bryan, Kelker, and more made legal claims for their freedom, 
they simultaneously asserted their identities as free persons and as imperial subjects who engaged 
in and participated in imperial and republican political institutions. In short, these cases serve as 
reflections of some of the ways that black litigants entered the Atlantic debate on who could be a 
subject or citizen, what membership to an empire or republic meant, and what rights and 
protections they were owed as free people. 
"As French Subjects:" Kinship and Inherited Subjecthood in the French Caribbean 
Recall Marie Francoise's freedom petition for her sons mentioned briefly in this thesis's 
introduction.128 In 1845, Marie Francoise went to the district court of Iberville Parish, Louisiana 
to make the case for the freedom of her sons. Her case provides a valuable example that 
demonstrates the connection of family and kinship ties in articulating petitioners' identities as free 
persons and imperial subjects in legal narratives. For example, Marie Francoise's narrative 
testimony rested on at least three family generations and she could state with confidence the history 
of her family's freedom that spanned over half a century, across the circum-Caribbean, and that 
reached to the French empire. 
Marie Francoise's narrative began in the late eighteenth century in French Saint-Domingue. 
She stated that her mother, Isabelle, lived as free women "from Petit Goave in the Island of Sto 
                                                             
128 Petition of Marie Francoise to the District Court, Iberville Parish, Louisiana, 12, June 1845, in Records of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Marie Francoise v. Cyrpien Ricard, George Delonde Jr., and Pauline Ricard, 
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[Santo] Domingo belonging at that time to the French government." Isabelle was quite close with 
Valerie Samanos, another free woman in the area. As the Haitian Revolution swept the island and 
when "the French government proclaimed and declared free all the slaves" in Saint-Domingue in 
response to the growing tensions of the revolution, the two women fled. Marie Francoise stated 
that her mother, "being friend of the said Valerie Samanos and nurse of the children," accompanied 
her. Marie Francoise told the court that they "both quitted together as free the Island of Sto [Santo] 
Domingo about in the year 1803 or 1804."  Together, Isabelle and Valerie left Saint-Domingue 
and went to Santiago de Cuba, a common destination for those fleeing the Haitian Revolution. 
Once in Cuba, the two women continued to live together and they "remained there as free about 6 
years at a certain place named Au Cané."  
Their time in Cuba was cut short in 1809 when the Spanish and French empires entered an 
imperial conflict that led the Spanish crown to expel French subjects from their territories. 
According to Marie Francoise, Isabelle and Valerie "were compelled to quit the island in the year 
1809 as French subjects" and they joined scores of other French persons fleeing Iberian territories, 
many headed to New Orleans where French refugees were accepted. Isabelle and Valerie likewise 
traveled to New Orleans where Marie Francoise stated that the port official "recorded [them] as 
free persons and authorized to remain" in Louisiana. Isabelle and Valerie soon moved to and "fixed 
their domicil" in Iberville, Louisiana, a more rural plantation area in the antebellum US South "on 
the right bank of the Mississippi." There, Valerie married a wealthy free black planter, Augustin 
Borie. As Valerie became the mistress of the Borie family's plantation, Isabelle, Marie Francoise, 
and Marie Francoise's children continued to live with Valerie and worked as free servants on the 
plantation for the next eighteen years. 
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After years of living in Iberville and in 1831, Valerie made her last will and testament 
"before the judge and notary Duton at Iberville."  Within pages of inheritance and property 
distribution, Valerie made sure to free one of her slaves. According to Marie Francoise, "...because 
your petitioner was black and her goddaughter, and the said Isabelle was dead," "[Valerie] declared 
falsely in her last will or testament made in 1831" "that she gives the freedom to your petitioner 
her slave god daughter, named Dauphine your petitioner." After both Isabelle and Valerie had 
passed away years later and Valerie's will was made public and official, Marie Francoise 
discovered the mistake in the will that counted her as one of Valerie's slaves, albeit freed. She 
stated that, afterwards, Valerie's husband and family "took advantage of the aforesaid last will," 
"falsely declaring your petitioner to be a [former] slave."  
Valerie's claim over Marie Francoise and her family dramatically changed their claims to 
freedom. For example, it removed their family's shared histories as free persons from Saint-
Domingue and Cuba. Further, it transformed Marie Francoise from a free woman to a freed 
woman. Considered a former slave and freed woman, Valerie's heirs claimed that Marie 
Francoise's children were their enslaved property since they were born from an enslaved mother. 
While Marie Francoise maintained a degree of freedom following the will, her children suffered 
greatly due to the false enslavement. According to Marie Francoise, the Borie family "possessed 
AS slaves the two sons of your petitioner named Bouqui and Edwards," "ill-treating them," and 
that "Edward has been wept...in the jail of the municipality No 1 in the City of New Orleans."  
With her children's freedom at stake and their suffering at the hands of the Borie family 
marked with violence and maltreatment, Marie Francoise determined to have their freedom 
formally recognized in law. In court in 1845, Marie Francoise recounted her family's long history 
of freedom across the Atlantic Caribbean, described Isabelle and Valerie's relationship as free 
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women, and asserted ideas that cemented their ties to freedom through family. In an effort to secure 
her children's freedom, she argued that the Borie family “cannot produce any title against your 
petitioner." 
Marie Francoise asked the court for more than her children's freedom, too. To make up for 
years of wrongful enslavement, she stated that the Borie family owed her and her children 
monetary damages. She stated that she and her children "have suffered damages at least to the 
amount of fifteen thousand dollars," and asserted that this amount corresponded to "having been 
deprived of their freedom and of the fruit of their labor."  
The amount of $15,000 was an exact calculation on the part of Marie Francoise. She tallied 
exact calculations for a precise amount of reparations owed and told the court that she determined 
the sum based on the date that she and her family began to live and work on the Borie family's 
plantation, in 1810. From then on and “until the present day,” she calculated “a rate at least of two 
dollars per day” that the Borie family owed them. Marked with an "X" and "not knowing how to 
write," Marie Francoise concluded her estimations by stating that “the false and pretended masters 
cannot allege the prescription against their freedom.” 
With the assistance of an attorney, Marie Francoise constructed a rich and detailed narrative to 
achieve her sons' freedom and have their history as free persons recognized. It traced three familial 
generations and tied together themes of war, revolution, imperial conflict, freedom and slavery, 
and displacement and migration in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World. However, the court did 
not agree with Marie Francoise's claims and denied her claims.  
Despite the denied response from the court, Marie Francoise's case presents an especially 
rich example of narrative claims to freedom in connection to empire, subjecthood, and family and 
kinship. According to Marie Francoise, her freedom was grounded in that of her mother's and her 
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claims centered on her filiation and ancestry to a free woman. For example, she stated that she was 
"the daughter of a certain Isabelle, FCW [free colored woman] and born from the said Isabelle 
during her freedom." Further, Marie Francoise stated that she had "two sisters older than her who 
were born free and who are living now in the island of Sto [Santo] Domingo." According to Marie 
Francoise, if her sisters could be free because of her mother's status as a free woman (and likely 
the Haitian Revolution), she should be, too, regardless of where she was. 
Marie Francoise also articulated her and her family's identities as free persons in connection to 
the French empire and imperial subjecthood. For example, she defined Isabel and Valerie as French 
subjects and stated that when they were forced to flee Cuba it was because "they were compelled 
to quit the island in the year 1809 as French subjects." In effect, Marie Francoise situated her 
family's identities as free persons in close connection to the fact that her mother was a free woman 
who was a French subject. Ultimately, she expressed her identity as a free woman as also tied to 
her family's connection as members of an empire. 
Marie Francoise's case shows how petitioners created narratives about their identities as free 
persons in connection to imperial subjecthood through family and generational ties. John Kelker 
and his family's petition to the Florida Legislature in this chapter's introduction reflects this theme 
well. In their petition, Kelker emphasized their long-acknowledged identities in connection to the 
Spanish empire. And, while a member of their family, Cecil Kelker, was born after the Spanish 
cession of Florida and, thus, technically not a member of the Spanish empire, John Kelker asserted 
that she was "the daughter of parents, subjects of Spain, and residents of West Florida at the date 
of the treaty," and therefore able to be given the same privileges as a subject.  
Identities of petitioners as free persons and in connection to imperial subjecthood and 
membership to an empire through family and kinship ties presents an interesting question: was 
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subjecthood something that could be inherited? Again, in John Kelker's case, it seems so: in the 
decision reached by the Florida Legislature, the committee granted John Kelker and his wife's 
children and "together with the children which may hereafter be born to them" freedom from state 
restrictions on free blacks.129 Also, Marie Francoise seemed to think so as well as she asserted her 
own identity as a free woman connected to her mother's freedom and imperial privileges. 
Ultimately, it seems that imperial subjecthood could sometimes reach through generations to 
substantiate legal privileges and free status. 
"Old Spanish Subjects:" Conclusion on Identities of Empire and Subjecthood in Law 
 Briefly returning to John Kelker and his family's petition, legal officials interviewed 
witnesses to evaluate the family's claims as longtime Spanish subjects.130 Witnesses included those 
with close connections to the Kelker family, namely longtime neighbors including George Walker. 
In Milton, Florida, Walker told officials that "when I went to Pensacola to reside, which was in 
1832, the Kelker family resided in the vicinity of Pensacola." Walker knew that the Kelker family 
was well-known, as well, and stated that they "were mentioned as old Spanish subjects." He went 
on and stated that John and Frederick Kelker were "of that family" and, importantly, that they 
"have resided continuously in the county up to the present.131" 
George Walker's testimony was brief, but it provided details into how community members 
at large understood and connected free black and former Spanish residents' identities in nineteenth-
century Florida. For example, Walker only knew John Kelker and his family after the Spanish 
cession when he "went to Pensacola to reside, which was in 1832." Indeed, he had no knowledge 
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of them when they were Spanish subjects. However, the immediate community in Pensacola did. 
Walker stated that community members told him that the Kelker's were "old Spanish subjects." 
Apparently, the Kelkers were a well-known and established family in Pensacola and community 
members relayed this to Walker. In his testimony, community knowledge played a significant role.  
John Kelker and his family had another witness, as well, who knew them for even longer 
than Walker. In fact, James E. Simpson SS stated that he knew the Kelker family since the Spanish 
cession of Florida to the United States. He testified that he had "known Fred and John Kelker from 
the year AD 1821 and that they have lived in the State of Florida ever since that time." In 1821, 
the Adams-Onis Treaty was ratified and Florida officially became a US territory.132  
Walker and Simpson's testimonies and comments on the Kelker's long-standing position in 
their Florida community forced legal officials to consider what Iberian empire and subjecthood 
meant for legal claims-making even forty years after the Spanish cession of Florida. According to 
Walker and Simpson, they and their community continued to identify the Kelkers in Iberian and 
imperial terms as "old Spanish subjects." Perhaps they considered subjecthood a continued status 
that despite jurisdictional changes, continued to confer rights and freedoms as did the Kelker's and 
the Florida State Legislature.133  
Taken together, the petitions in this chapter reflected how litigants envisioned and 
articulated their identities as free persons in close connection to Atlantic empires and subjecthood. 
Petitioners first and foremost asserted their status as free persons - by birth, emancipation, or 
manumission. To support their claims to freedom, they also created narratives that illuminated 
their identities as free persons. They stated that they were black militiamen, sailors, and cooks. 
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Especially important in their narratives and another important way that they articulated their status 
as free persons, petitioners described their identities in connection to Atlantic empires. For 
example, litigants positioned their claims to freedom in close proximity with the imperial 
metropole in Europe rather than individual colonial authorities. José Gelar told the Superior Court 
in Twiggs County, Georgia that he was from Cuba, "belonging to the dominion of his Catholic 
Majesty the King of Spain." Zephir petitioned for his freedom and likewise aligned it with British 
imperial authority and decrees as he served as a black militiaman in their army. Litigants ultimately 
aligned themselves and their identities as free persons with the centers of imperial power, 
authority, and the crown, often invoking direct relationships to the king. 
Moreover, petitioners crafted narratives in which they sometimes identified themselves as 
imperial subjects to strategically position their freedom in connection to ideas on subjecthood and 
citizenship. John Kelker and his family connected their rights as free persons to their long-held 
connections to the Spanish empire in Florida and Samuel Bryan asserted that he was a free man 
from Jamaica and originally "born a subject of the King of Great Britain."  In both Gelar and 
Bryan's cases, petitioners also aligned identities as free persons alongside ideas of subjecthood and 
citizenship, propelling their legal cases for freedom into a larger discourse regarding legal and 
political recognition for slaves and free blacks in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World. Finally, 
Marie Francoise, as well as John Kelker's family, framed their claims to freedom through family 
and kinship ties that included generations of imperial subjecthood in which membership to an 
empire could be inherited. 
The next chapter in this thesis likewise continues to explore the importance of petitioners' 
identities in legal narratives - this time through witness and community testimonies. Like the 
petitioners themselves, neighbors, acquaintances, and friends and family played an important role 
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in articulating litigants' often ambiguous identities. For example, Kelker's witnesses above, Walker 
and Simpson, provided testimonies that are useful in examining the ways that American residents 
in Florida understood free black communities of former Spanish subjects, often through long-
standing community knowledge and memory. Indeed, litigants' identities based on subjecthood 
and empire could permeate into community networks in legal narratives for freedom, as well. 
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CHAPTER 4 
"ACQUAINTED WITH A GREAT NUMBER OF PERSONS:" NETWORKS OF 
BELONGING IN LAW 
Recall Candido Gomez's petition discussed briefly in the introduction to this thesis.134 In 1818, 
the First District Court of New Orleans had few details on Candido Gomez's life. He stated in clear 
terms that he was "born free and raised free in the Kingdom of Brazil," yet he provided little more 
information about his life there. He told the court how he ended up in New Orleans as a victim of 
the illicit slave trade by pirates who overtook the ship he was working on as a sailor, but, for more 
details, legal officials would have to look elsewhere. Dedicating substantial time and effort into 
determining if Gomez truly was "born free and raised free in the Kingdom of Brazil," officials 
interviewed and obtained witness testimonies from some of his acquaintances, friends, and 
shipmates to learn more about Gomez's life. 
Officials interviewed a diverse group of witnesses who provided testimonies on Gomez's status 
as a free man, from those who knew him in Brazil, to shipmates in New Orleans, and even a 
Louisiana port authority. Jose Barbosa, a long-time friend in Brazil whose mother was Gomez's 
godmother, Joaquim Fernandez and Manuel Joaquim, shipmates who sailed with Gomez onboard 
the Falcon and were in captivity with him by French pirates, and Edwin Lorraine, a port official 
in New Orleans who recorded Gomez as free when he entered the city, gave testimonies on 
Gomez's behalf. They provided anecdotes about how they knew Gomez, their experiences and 
relationships together, and, importantly, if they thought Gomez was in fact a free man.  
Jose Barbosa's testimony is an especially interesting narrative on Gomez's life and further 
serves as a window into nineteenth-century Brazil, family and slavery in the Americas, and 
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Atlantic travel.135 Barbosa stated that he knew Gomez quite well and had intimate ties to his family. 
He testified that he knew Gomez “upwards of fifteen years,” "was born about 1/2 mile of[f] St. 
Salvador," and often spent time at Gomez’s “father and mother’s house in the Bay of St. Salvador." 
Moreover, legal officials noted that "the witnesses mother is his [Gomez's] godmother." 
Apparently, Barbosa was quite connected to Gomez and his family in Salvador, Brazil. 
While he gave clear comments on his connections to Gomez and his family, Barbosa provided 
a somewhat more complex version of Gomez's freedom in Brazil. Barbosa stated that Gomez's 
mother "was originally a slave and he the son of his master." However, Barbosa stated that while 
Gomez's mother was a slave, she was “a slave conditionally, that is to say that she could not be 
sold above a fixed [...].136” Further, he claimed that “Gomez’s father, as master of his mother, 
treated Gomez as his son and not his slave.” In telling the court when he last saw Gomez, Barbosa 
stated that he “last saw Gomez about seven years ago,” and that he was then “free and a 
shoemaker...taught the trade by his father.”  
Barbosa presented a complicated version of Gomez's status and identity as a free man in Brazil. 
According to Barbosa, Gomez and his mother were indeed connected to slavery as he was born 
from a slave mother and her master. However, his mother was a slave "conditionally" and his white 
father recognized him as his son and treated him as a free person. According to Barbosa, they 
occupied an ambiguous and perhaps flexible category that allowed limited access to freedom. In 
Barbosa's testimony, he presented a complex view of Gomez where he was recognized as a free 
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man by his community, immediate family, and his white father who was his mother's master. 
Moreover, he was a skilled laborer as a shoemaker, "taught the trade by his father."  
Barbosa provided further details about Gomez's family relations to legal officials. In his cross-
examination, Barbosa claimed that Gomez’s "father sent him to the Havana" and "on account of 
drunkenness." Barbosa went on and stated that Gomez's father "placed him onboard of a vessel 
bound for the Coast of Guinea and that at his arrival at the Havana it was desired that he should 
have a shoemaker's shop." In the transcript for Barbosa's testimony, a legal official asked, "from 
whom he had the above details," and Barbosa explained it was "because he was in the house of 
Candido's mother who told him what he has stated." Barbosa went on and explained that "the 
conversation took place between Candido's mother and his white brothers," and "that the brothers 
wished to prevent his departure but he [Gomez] was already shipped off by the father." Apparently, 
while Gomez was treated as a free man by his father, his father still maintained control over him 
and his slave mother to great degrees. Gomez's departure forced by his father reflects some of the 
tensions inherent in slavery and the unequal power dynamics that masters held over slave mothers 
and their children. 
In his final cross examination, Barbosa described to legal officials some details about Gomez 
as an individual. Barbosa stated that he was "not certain of Candido's having been in the U.S. 
before the time of seven years ago" and that "he has not known the plff [plaintiff] in any other part 
of the United States." While Barbosa was unaware of Gomez visiting the United States before, he 
knew about some of Gomez's other travels. According to Barbosa, Gomez "had made but two 
voyages before that time one to [...] & one to Mozambico.137" Barbosa also commented that 
"Candido may now speak French or English since he has been in the country" and that "when he 
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knew him 7 years ago, he spoke only Spanish & Portuguese and some words of Mina."138 
According to Barbosa, Gomez was a well-traveled, knowledgeable and skilled, and multi-lingual 
free man in Brazil and the larger Atlantic World. 
Barbosa's testimony, as well as the rest of Gomez's witnesses, is interesting as it compelled 
legal officials to grapple with competing and conflicting Iberian versions of slavery, free black 
communities, and Atlantic voyages in the antebellum US South. Barbosa explained a system of 
slavery in Brazil tied to negotiation and that could be defined with conditions. While slavery was 
also negotiated in the US South between slave and master in various forms, Barbosa's testimony 
brings Atlantic, and specifically Iberian, versions of slavery and freedom into the fold of 
antebellum law.139 His testimony relates to larger studies on a spectrum of unfreedom in the 
Americas, for example, conditional freedoms, small-scale and baptismal manumissions, the 
practice of pedir papel (requests for change in master by slaves) and coartación (gradual self-
purchase arrangements between slave and master) in Cuba, and more.140 Indeed, Barbosa's 
commentary demonstrated that slavery and freedom in Brazil was not absolute.141 
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139 For examples of antebellum negotiations in slavery, see Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, (2000). For 
example, slaves' subsistence crops. 
 
140 Alejandro de la Fuente, “Slaves and the Creation of Legal Rights in Cuba: Coartación and Papel,” (2007); 
Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente, “Manumission and Freedom in the Americas: Cuba, Louisiana, Virginia, 
1500s-1700s,” Quaderni Storici, Jan. 2015, pp. 15-48; Michelle McKinley, Fractional Freedoms (2016). 
 
141 Michelle McKinley explores the practice of "conditional freedom" in the early colonial Andes and presents 
significant findings that resonate with Jose Barbosa's testimony in her examination of baptismal manumission 
practices in Lima (Fractional Freedoms, 2017). She states that in baptismal cases, masters sometimes conferred 
freedom to their slaves' children, a method to publicly appear benevolent while still maintaining control over the 
child's parents. Baptismal manumissions demonstrated contradictions in manumission and the importance of the 
household and domestic slavery - many of the children, while legally free from their baptismal manumission, still 
continued to live enslaved lives under their parent's masters' homes. While McKinley's examples take place in early 
Spanish colonial Lima, her research provides a comparative connection to Jose Barbosa's testimony on Gomez in 
Brazil, conditional slavery, and ambiguity as a slave or free person in Iberian colonial empires.  
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Barbosa's testimony also illuminated Iberian ideas about free black communities in the 
nineteenth-century Atlantic Caribbean, particularly in Cuba and the type of labor and craft that 
Gomez would have established if he arrived in Havana. Barbosa detailed Gomez’s skilled labor in 
shoemaking, a trade taught to him by his father, and that “it was desired that he should have a 
shoemaker’s shop in Havana.” In the early nineteenth century, free blacks in Cuba increasingly 
held the majority of skilled crafts as shoemakers, bakers, smiths, carpenters, and potters, for some 
examples, in urban cities like Havana, and Gomez would have joined this group of skilled black 
artisans with degrees of social prestige.142  
Finally, Barbosa also provided valuable details about Gomez's identity as a multi-lingual, well-
traveled, and skilled free person. According to Barbosa's testimony, Gomez fit Ira Berlin's 
definition of an "Atlantic Creole," someone who had "linguistic dexterity, cultural plasticity, and 
social agility."143 Especially interesting are Barbosa's comments that Gomez knew "a few words 
of Mina" and traveled before to Mozambique that connected him to the larger Atlantic African 
World, as well as possibly the trans-Atlantic African slave trade in the nineteenth century. 
According to Barbosa, Gomez was a flexible and savvy individual who might have known even 
more languages like French or English and new skills since he last saw him, too. 
Jose Barbosa's testimony likely had an important impact on Gomez's case and the lower 
courts originally granted his petition until it was later overturned at the state supreme court after a 
lengthy appeals process.144 His testimony gave insight into Gomez's life in Brazil, at times 
contradicted and complicated Gomez's claims to freedom, and added new information about 
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144 See the conclusion of this chapter for more details on the outcome of Gomez's case. 
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slavery, family, and movement in the Atlantic World. While the lower court decision in favor of 
Gomez was eventually changed, Gomez and his witnesses like Barbosa originally convinced legal 
officials to consider Atlantic ideas about slavery and freedom. 
This chapter examines the role of witnesses and community members in freedom petitions like 
Candido Gomez's case. Witnesses served a vital role in freedom-claiming in law and neighbors, 
friends, family members, and acquaintances provided testimonies and depositions that described 
close relationships, personal opinions, and impressions of petitioners. Sometimes they helped the 
petitioners and affirmed their claims. Other times, they offered contradicting narratives that 
complicated the freedom petition. Petitioners' reputations, character, and identities were on display 
in their witnesses' testimonies.  
Importantly, witnesses and community members reflected the Atlantic networks to which 
petitioners belonged and had access. This thesis calls these community connections "networks of 
belonging" in reference to the networks in which petitioners and witnesses both expressed ideas 
about Atlantic belonging. For example, petitioners took a calculated risk in calling upon certain 
witnesses to vouch for them. Sometimes witnesses provided reliable testimony and other times 
contradicted petitioners. By involving certain witnesses on their behalf, petitioners used their 
witnesses to articulate what social networks they envisioned themselves as belonging and having 
access to, such as groups of free blacks, skilled laborers, sailors, and religious networks through 
god-parentage, for some examples. The groups they called upon to vouch for them serves as a 
window into the groups they connected themselves to and, further, with whom they linked their 
status as free persons. 
Also, witnesses and community members expressed plenty of ideas of their own about how 
they envisioned the petitioners' identities in the Atlantic World. Their testimonies further reflect 
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how community members grappled with the sometimes-ambiguous identities of petitioners from 
across the Atlantic. As they attempted to categorize and make sense of petitioners' claims to 
freedom, their narratives reflect the ways that people in the nineteenth century understood and 
constructed ideas about Atlantic identity. Further, their testimonies can be seen to a certain extent 
as a reflection of the petitioners' performances of freedom and imperial identities as discussed in 
chapter three.  
Ultimately, witnesses like neighbors, shipmates, family and friends, and acquaintances served 
an important role in freedom-claiming for petitioners from across the Atlantic World. Witnesses 
sometimes expressed doubt and uncertainty in ambiguous circumstances and tried to mitigate and 
articulate how they understood the petitioner's identity. In other cases, witnesses remained fully 
convinced of the petitioners' claims to freedom and connections to Atlantic empires, offering 
compelling cases about the petitioners' claims. In most cases, like Jose Barbosa in Candido 
Gomez's, they neither gave definitive comments on their free or enslaved status, but, rather, served 
as a character reference and provided details on their lived experiences. In any case, witnesses 
provided valuable narratives in addition to petitioners' testimonies that revealed networks of 
belonging across the Atlantic. 
"Accidentally on the Levee:" Networks of Belonging in the British Atlantic 
John Lewis, his freedom petition mentioned briefly in the introduction to this thesis, made 
a compelling case for freedom. In 1815, he told legal officials that he was "born in the island of 
Jamaica of free parents" and "always enjoyed his freedom until he was forcibly and unlawfully 
seized in the state of Kentucky."145 Following his work and travel as a sailor onboard the ship 
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Morning Star from Scotland to South Carolina, Lewis stated that he had been "seduced into the 
state of Kentucky," "there seized and transported" and "shipped from thence and sold as a slave" 
to be "held in bondage by a certain Harvey Norton...contrary to...his lawful rights." 
J. L. Turner, Lewis's attorney, believed John Lewis's freedom suit. On Lewis's behalf, 
Turner stated "I am so far disposed to assist this man in the recovery of his rights as to offer my 
services" and he requested that "the court will give leave to file his petition." According to Turner, 
what further convinced him of Lewis's rights as a free man were Lewis's witnesses. Turner stated, 
"I have [...] with the witnesses in this case and have no doubt the plf. [plaintiff] is a free man." 
Witnesses for Lewis included "two women of colour in this city who knew him and his parents in 
Jamaica to be free people," and John Kimbel, one of Lewis's shipmates on the Morning Star. 
Turner referenced "Mr. John Kimbel" as a convincing witness who knew Lewis "in 
Scotland and shipped himself at Dundee and sailed for Charleston" on the same ship as Lewis. In 
fact, John Kimbel provided a quite detailed deposition regarding Lewis and his life in the British 
Atlantic in favor of his freedom. Legal officials noted that Kimbel "first knew the plaintiff [Lewis] 
in Dundee in Scotland, in the fall of the year 1809" and that he believed Lewis "was then secreted 
in a boarding house, being a deserter from a British Man of War.146" According to Kimbel, Lewis 
soon after worked "as a cook on board the American ship Morning Star" where Kimbel "was 
chiefmate."  
Kimbel also confirmed Lewis's testimony that they sailed on the Morning Star to 
Charleston, South Carolina and there he was "discharged with the rest of the crew." However, 
Kimbel further added new details to their experiences sailing across the British Atlantic to the 
antebellum South and stated that the "ship was seized in Charleston in consequence of some breach 
                                                             
146 "Man of War" being a British royal navy warship. 
86 
 
of laws of the United States, supposed the embargo law." Following the brief seizure of the ship, 
Kimbel stated that Lewis, "after being discharged from the said ship...agreed to bind himself for 
[...] years to a person keeping a boarding house in Charleston." After that, Kimbel "sailed from 
Charleston for New York" and that was the last time he saw Lewis until they met again in New 
Orleans, "accidentally on the Levee, about two weeks ago, when he was hired aboard the Brig 
Archimedes," where he worked as a mate. 
Although it had been years since Kimbel saw Lewis, he recalled much about him and his 
status as a free man and from Jamaica. He stated that he "does not know that the plaintiff was born 
free, but that he was free when he last knew him" because there were "no negroe slaves in 
Scotland." Further, Kimbel stated that "from his dialect, that said plaintiff is a native of Jamaica, 
and has always reported himself as a native of Jamaica in the West Indies." Kimbel also held Lewis 
in high esteem as a shipmate, stating "the plaintiff was a good seaman." Further, as to if Lewis 
truly was a deserter of a British war ship, Kimbel stated that "he never saw him [Lewis] on board 
a British man of war, but from the circumstances of his concealment he believes [...]. 
John Lewis' witnesses played an important role in his freedom suit, especially in securing 
legal aid through J. L. Turner. Turner was convinced to offer his services to Lewis's suit in no 
small part because of convincing witness testimonies, including two women in New Orleans who 
apparently knew Lewis and his parents as free persons in Jamaica and John Kimbel who worked 
with Lewis in the British Atlantic.  
Kimbel's testimony was especially valuable as he articulated Lewis's identity in connection 
to the British empire and as a free man from the West Indies. For example, Kimbel aligned John 
Lewis as a free black man under the British empire because of the way Lewis presented his identity. 
Kimbel understood Lewis as a free man from Jamaica because of his performance of that identity 
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as he stated that he believed Lewis was from Jamaica because of the way he spoke. Further, he 
also referenced that Lewis consistently identified himself as Jamaican and "has always reported 
himself as a native of Jamaica in the West Indies".  
Ultimately, Kimbel's testimony reflects some of the ways that witnesses' testimonies can 
serve as a window into petitioners everyday lived experiences performing their Atlantic and 
imperial identities. Further, Kimbel invoked the British empire in his testimony as he articulated 
ideas on freedom and slavery across empires in the Atlantic. He stated that he believed Lewis was 
not a slave because in the British Atlantic there were "no negroe slaves in Scotland." Importantly, 
Kimbel's testimony, as well as the two black women's comments that they knew Lewis and his 
parents as free persons in Jamaica, compelled legal officials to consider Lewis's rights as free man 
in broader, more Atlantic terms. For example, Lewis's witnesses referenced slavery and 
abolitionism in Great Britain, the performance of Atlantic identities in his dialect and how Lewis 
identified himself to others, and kinship and community knowledges from the two women 
acquainted with Lewis's family. Together, their voices brought the voices of free black women and 
Atlantic sailors from across the British empire into freedom-claiming in the US South. 
"Seventeen Months as Prisoners to the English:" Networks of Belonging in the Atlantic 
Caribbean 
Returning again to Candido Gomez's freedom suit, he gave few details about his 
experiences as a black sailor onboard the Falcon in the Caribbean. Jose Barbosa offered rich 
testimony about his life in Brazil, but even his comments stopped short at the Bay of Salvador. 
Much about Gomez's experiences onboard the Falcon as a free sailor, therefore, had to be obtained 
by legal officials elsewhere. Luckily, Gomez had two witnesses for him who were also sailors 
onboard the Falcon, Joaquim Fernandez and Manuel Joaquim. Their testimonies together serve to 
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fill in some of the missing gaps in Gomez's petition regarding life on the ship, provide details about 
its voyage, and give opinions on Gomez's identity, free or enslaved status, and belonging in Brazil 
- albeit uncertain at times. 
In Joaquim Fernandez's testimony, Fernandez stated that the Falcon was an African slave ship 
and there were fourteen slaves onboard, all "bosal negros from the coast, slaves..."147 Regarding 
his relationship to Gomez, he knew few details about him and his impression of Gomez as an 
enslaved or free man was left largely speculation. He stated that "he knows Candido in the Bay of 
St. Salvador and shipped with him onboard the vessel for the Havana," but that "Candido was 
shipped in the same capacity as the other negros."148 Further, Fernandez stated that "Gomez helped 
the sailors onboard." Fernandez's comments that Gomez "was shipped in the same capacity" as the 
other slaves, yet that he worked onboard and "helped the sailors" presented a contradicting 
narrative of whether Gomez was enslaved or a free sailor. Further, his depictions of Gomez 
reflected him as occupying two competing spheres of enslavement or freedom. Reflecting these 
uncertainties, Fernandez stated that he "knows not whether he be a slave or not."  
 Manuel Joaquim, another of Gomez's witnesses and recorded by legal officials as "a mulatto" 
man, corroborated Fernandez's testimony, likewise full of uncertainty. According to Joaquim, "all 
he knows is that Candido came onboard of the same vessel where he was as a slave with other 
slaves from the Bay of St. Salvador onboard the brig Falcon." According to Joaquim, Gomez's 
status as a slave was clearer to him and he associated him with the other slaves from Salvador. 
Further, he encountered Alexander Bonlivar and Gomez in New Orleans before the freedom 
petition and stated that "Bonlivar showed him the plff [plaintiff, Gomez] and said he was his slave" 
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148 "Coast," meaning the Coast of Guinea (referenced in another section of testimony in Gomez's petition). 
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and "that Candido himself showed him said Bonneval [Bonlivar] saying he was his master." 
According to Fernandez and Joaquim, Gomez certainly came onboard the Falcon in Salvador in 
Brazil, but whether it was as a free or enslaved man was ambiguous and in contention among them 
and Gomez. 
While they expressed doubt regarding Gomez’s free or enslaved status, Fernandez and Joaquim 
spoke knowledgably about the Falcon’s journey through the Atlantic. With certainty, they stated 
that the ship was "destined for the Havana" and that it was a slave ship with fourteen "bosal negros 
from the coast." Further, although they sailed on the Falcon "upwards of 6 years ago," they still 
stated with confidence the name of the captain, "Francisco Garcia," and important and previously 
unknown details about its journey, purpose, and detainment. For example, Gomez only indicated 
in his testimony one instance of detainment in the Caribbean when French privateers commanded 
possibly by the famous pirate, Jean Lafitte, captured their ship and took it to Grande Terre. 
However, Fernandez and Joaquim both stated that the ship was actually captured twice: first by 
the English navy and then by French privateers. According to Fernandez, the Falcon “started for 
the Havana and they were captured by an English Brig and taken to St. Thomas.” There, they spent 
“seventeen months as prisoners to the English.”  
It is unclear why the English detained the Falcon based on Fernandez and Joaquim’s testimony, 
however, an 1813 account of the “violent and oppressive capture of Brazilian vessels by the 
English” provided insights into the occurrence. The 1813 text, Representations of the Brazilian 
Merchants and Against the Insults Offered to the Portuguese Flag and Against the Violent and 
Oppressive Capture of some of their Vessels by Some Officers Belonging to the English Navy, was 
first written by a Portuguese investigator to the “prince regent of Portugal” and then translated into 
English to be published in London. The author wrote on behalf of Brazilian merchants and as a 
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matter of importance to “national honor, in defense of the flag, and Portuguese independence, 
which has been violated and invaded in its very possessions."149 
Details regarding the detainment of the Falcon appeared in the investigator’s section titled, 
“The First Representation of the Merchants of Bahia,” and detailed the unjust detainment of the 
ship according to the investigator. He stated the English detained the Falcon and examined its 
shipping papers, journals, and clearances as it passed through the Caribbean and decided that it did 
not have proper permission to sail through. The English then “took, confiscated, and hostilely 
conducted it to the ports of the British empire into St. Thomas" to better understand the nature of 
the Falcon’s voyage and trade. According to the investigator, the detainment was without reason 
and an example of the “insatiable thirst for prizes or perhaps the abuse by their powerful maritime 
influence” of the English. The investigator stated that during the time that the Falcon was detained 
in St. Thomas, the English appealed the High Court of Admiralty in London to continue its 
detainment of the ship, but were denied.  
The English released the Falcon after more than a year of detainment and investigation, and it 
started to remake its journey to Cuba. However, Gomez, Fernandez, Joaquim, the crew, and the 
African captives onboard experienced further misfortunes. The ship was captured again, this time 
“on the shores of Havana by a privateer" and "carried to the Grande Terre," part of the small French 
island Guadalupe in the Lesser Antilles of the Caribbean, and a well-known pirate den. 
Joaquim stated that during their captivity by the French pirates, he "remained a long time at 
Grande Terre, say 2 or 3 months a prisoner." As for Gomez and the other slaves and crew, Joaquim 
stated that "Candido and the others were taken somewhere else he knows not where." Further, 
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Joaquim did not know if the infamous pirate Jean Lafitte commanded the privateers. Instead, he 
commented that "the privateer was commanded by one Marcos who is since dead," and "does not 
know where said Marcos lived or died."150  
Recalling events that "happened upwards of 6 years ago," Joaquim Fernandez and Manuel 
Joaquim provided testimonies that illuminated the experiences that Gomez, the crew, and the 
African slaves faced on the Falcon’s journey across the Atlantic. Their testimonies demonstrated 
the renewed direct African trade in the Spanish Caribbean, specifically Cuba, in the early 
nineteenth century, the often-tenuous relationships and interactions among empires in the 
Caribbean, and, importantly, how they made sense of Gomez's and the African "bosal" slaves' 
Atlantic identities. 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and specifically following the Haitian 
Revolution, Cuba transformed from a Spanish settlement and port colony focused on small-scale 
agricultural production to an export-based system with sugar and coffee plantations mirrored after 
English and French models in Barbados and French Saint-Domingue.151 The itinerary of the 
Falcon that included "the coast of Guinea" and Cuba, and having “bosal slaves” onboard reflect 
this shift in Cuba’s transition toward export-based plantation models and the second 
“Africanization” of the island with the direct-African slave trade.152 Further, the Falcon also 
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illuminates some of the impacts of the slave trade in the Atlantic Caribbean, namely through 
examples of imperial tensions as demonstrated by the English detainment of the ship and illicit 
trade such as piracy. 
Moreover, Fernandez and Joaquim's comments regarding the African captives as “bosal slaves 
from the coast of Guinea” revealed their ideas about African ethnic origins in the slave trade.  
Regardless of whether the African slaves in fact came from Guinea or another slave trading port 
along Africa’s Atlantic coast (like El Mina, of which Gomez knew some words according to Jose 
Barbosa), Fernandez and Joaquim’s designation of the captives’ identities as from “the coast of 
Guinea” demonstrate that they considered the African captives as perhaps belonging overall to 
“Guinea” and without more specific ethnic origins.  The “coast of Guinea” was in reality home to 
numerous African ethnic groups through the “rivers of Guinea” such as the Biafra, Bran, 
Mandinga, or Zape, to name a few.153 In short, Fernandez and Joaquim’s testimonies reveal how 
they understood the international slave trade across the Atlantic and, importantly, how they made 
sense of African identities and origins within it. 
Their testimonies also reflected ideas of empire and tensions among nations across the Atlantic 
World. For example, their testimonies on the detainment of the Falcon by the English and the 
additional 1813 commentary by the Portuguese investigator reflected imperial conflict in the early 
nineteenth-century Caribbean. Their commentaries revealed infighting between imperial powers 
in the Caribbean as the investigator described the English’s detainment of the ship and, according 
to the investigator, served as evidence of British greed and arrogance. Fernandez and Joaquim’s 
statements that they were treated as “prisoners” for the duration of seventeen months in St. Thomas 
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support the investigator’s allegations of English hostility and serve as an example of the 
experiences of ordinary individuals involved in imperial trading and political conflicts. 
Importantly, their narratives regarding Gomez and if he was a free or enslaved man - along 
with Jose Barbosa and Gomez's own comments - serve as a lens through which to view how 
Gomez's identity was articulated throughout his petition. For example, as Gomez and his witnesses 
provided anecdotes and narratives about their lived experiences, Gomez and his witnesses grappled 
with how to make sense of Atlantic identities and ideas of freedom and slavery. For Gomez, his 
identity as a free man was linked to the Brazilian empire. For example, he aligned his freedom 
with "the Kingdom of Brazil" and stated that there he was "born free and raised a free man."  
His witnesses also grappled with how to categorize and present a clear view of Gomez as 
they knew him. Barbosa considered Gomez as part of an ambiguous spectrum of slavery and 
freedom in Brazil and, importantly, his freedom or enslavement were not in absolute terms. 
Instead, he considered Gomez and his family to be part of a system of slavery that could be 
conditional and offered limited "fractions" of freedom.154 To him, Gomez's identity would likely 
be better defined when viewed as an Atlantic Creole. Barbosa's most telling comments came from 
his assertions that Gomez was multi-lingual, well-traveled, and skilled. Indeed, Barbosa connected 
Gomez's identity with the notion of flexible Atlantic creolization and not a specific empire or place. 
While imperial belonging, conditional slavery, and creolization characterized Gomez and 
Barbosa's notions of Atlantic identity, sailors Joaquim Fernandez and Manuel Joaquim understood 
Gomez in more ambiguous terms. They were less certain about how to articulate his Atlantic 
identity and left much to speculation. Instead, they focused on their experiences at sea on the 
Falcon and their lived experiences in the Caribbean. Regardless of their uncertainties, their 
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testimonies serve to demonstrate the ambiguities of Atlantic and African identities in the early 
nineteenth century. 
"Some Persons Who Knew her to Be a Free Woman:" Networks of Belonging in the French 
Caribbean 
Simon Gallien Preval attempted to sell Catherine, a black woman, three times.155 Each 
time, he was unsuccessful. In 1818 in New Orleans, Preval “tried twice to effectuate the sale in 
public auctions at Maspero Coffee House, but did not succeed.” On another occasion, Preval 
briefly sold Catherine to a Mr. Laresche, however, Laresche quickly rescinded the sale. Upon 
rejecting the sale, Laresche apparently “became so affected with madness that he ran into the 
streets totally uncovered.” After each unsuccessful attempt to sell Catherine, Preval, a Justice of 
the Peace in New Orleans, locked her in the parish jail.156 
Each of Preval’s attempts to sell Catherine failed. For one, she was a free woman. Catherine 
stated that she was a free woman from French Saint-Domingue, and that she travelled from Port 
Au Prince to Cuba and, finally, New Orleans where she spent “upwards of a decade.” Likely 
travelling across the Caribbean because of the Haitian Revolution, she ended up in New Orleans 
with scores of other French refugees. 
Further, she was a well-known resident and community member in New Orleans. Each 
time Preval tried to sell her, community members intervened. Catherine stated that at the public 
slave auctions at the Maspero Coffee House, a busy slave auction site, “some persons who knew 
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her to be a free woman manifested…in such a manner that Preval ordered the auction to discretion 
[...] the sale.” And when Preval finally succeeded in selling Catherine to Mr. Laresche, albeit 
briefly, Laresche immediately rescinded the sale because he “was informed that she was a free 
woman.” Laresche even went so far as to make a public display of the rejected transaction by 
running out into the streets of New Orleans "totally uncovered" and shouting that he did not 
purchase a free woman. Despite the assistance of community members who affirmed and protected 
Catherine’s freedom, she remained enslaved and imprisoned by Preval. It would take more than 
community intervention for Catherine to gain her freedom and, in 1819, she pursued legal recourse 
and sued Preval at the parish court for her freedom. 
Catherine narrated her experiences as a free woman to the New Orleans parish court in April 
1819. According to her testimony, she was a free woman from the French island of Saint-
Domingue, lived in Port Au Prince, and “enjoyed all of the privileges of a free person for a great 
number of years.” Catherine described her life in Saint-Domingue and stated that “during her 
residence in Port Au Prince, she lived with Francois Michel, a seaman, commonly called Mr. 
Cadet.” Around the time of the Haitian Revolution in Saint-Domingue, she “evacuated Port Au 
Prince with Cadet and sailed to St. Yago [Santiago] de Cuba,” a common entry port for French 
refugees fleeing Saint-Domingue after the Haitian Revolution.157  
Catherine and Cadet stayed in Cuba as free persons until they were forced to flee in 1809 due 
to the expulsion of the French in Spanish territories and they travelled to New Orleans where the 
French were received as refugees. Catherine stated that she spent “nearly a decade” in New Orleans 
as a free woman and “has always been considered a free woman both in St. Yago [Santiago] and 
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in this city [New Orleans].” More than that, she stated that she was a property holding woman and 
“possessed slaves in St. Yago [Santiago] which she brought with her” to New Orleans.  
Then, in October 1818, Simon Gallien Preval threatened Catherine’s privileges as a free and 
property-holding black woman in New Orleans. He arrested her, put in her in jail, and “claimed to 
own her and tried to sell her” on two occasions at the Maspero Coffee House and to Mr. Laresche. 
And when he tried to sell her, community members thwarted his attempts and vouched for 
Catherine’s character and reputation as a free woman in the community. Still though, Preval 
claimed Catherine was his slave and imprisoned her.  
“Under those circumstances” and with the assistance of an attorney, Catherine asked the 
district court of New Orleans that “Preval be cited to appear before this honorable court and answer 
this petition.” She stated that she was “illegally detained in slavery, and moreover in jail” because 
of Preval, and asked the court that she “may be deemed the enjoyment of her freedom.” Further, 
she told the court that “she has been acquainted with a great number of persons who are now in 
this city [New Orleans] and who will certainly prove most evidently all the facts alleged in this 
petition.” She concluded with a request that Preval be “condemned to pay the costs of the suit.158” 
The court partially granted her petition in April 1819. 
Catherine's case is an important petition that demonstrates the experiences of free black women 
as property holders in the nineteenth-century Atlantic. She was a free woman in the Caribbean and 
in New Orleans, and also a property owner. In fact, some of her property consisted of slaves that 
she “possessed…in St. Yago and brought with her to New Orleans.”  
Catherine’s experiences as a free and property-holding black woman in the Caribbean provides 
an example of their roles in the Atlantic World as important community members. Free afro-
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descended women played important social and economic roles in Latin America and the Caribbean 
as skilled artisans, shop owners, and property-holders.159 They contributed to and participated in 
economic development and occupied important social roles connected to kinship and community 
networks. Based on Catherine’s testimony, she was likely known as a vecina, or permanent 
community member, in Saint-Domingue, Cuba, and the antebellum South based on the community 
relations she cultivated.160  
Perhaps most notably, Catherine’s petition provides a window into the formation of important 
community networks in the Atlantic World. As evidenced in her testimony, Preval’s attempts to 
sell her failed when people in the community “who knew her to be a free woman” intervened and 
vouched for her reputation as a free, property holding black woman in New Orleans. These 
community networks existed beyond New Orleans and in the circum-Caribbean, as well, and she 
stated that she was always known as a free woman in Santiago, Cuba, too. 
Especially central to Catherine's petition is how she articulated her status and identity as a free, 
property-holding woman by invoking the community networks to which she belonged. As litigants 
called upon witnesses or invoked community protection, they also revealed to which networks 
they belonged and had access to, often revealing simultaneously their own status. For example, in 
John Lewis and Candido Gomez's cases, they both relied heavily on witness testimonies from 
fellow black sailors like them and revealed the Atlantic community networks to which they 
belonged. 
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In Catherine's case, she stated repeatedly that she was a free woman in Saint-Domingue, Cuba, 
and the antebellum South, as well as well-known by free persons like the seaman Michel Francois 
and community members in each area. She even told legal officials that she could call on 
community members to vouch for her status as a free woman and that “she has been acquainted 
with a great number of persons who are now in this city [New Orleans] and who will certainly 
prove most evidently all the facts alleged in this petition.” Catherine likely envisioned herself as 
belonging to a larger network of free black property-holding women in the Caribbean and, by 
narrating the instances where community members came to her aid when Preval attempted to sell 
her, she also situated herself as a free woman in the broader antebellum southern slave trade 
communities, at places such as the Maspero Coffee House and individual sales. 
"Gomez Is of Right a Free Man:" Conclusion on Networks of Belonging across Iberian, British, 
and French Empires in the Atlantic US South 
Returning once more to Candido Gomez's freedom suit, in 1818 Edwin Lorraine, a “naval 
officer in the ports of New Orleans,” appeared before the First District Court. He did not know 
Candido Gomez well and in fact knew quite little about him. However, he testified on behalf of 
Gomez and stated that he “believes that Gomez is of right a free man.” The reason Lorraine 
believed Gomez was "of right a free man" had little to do with Gomez and his witnesses' narratives 
about life in the Atlantic; Lorraine did not speak about Brazil, the Falcon, or French pirates.  
Instead, he discussed the legality of Gomez even being in Louisiana. According to Lorraine, 
Gomez was free because he “was imported into the country since January 1808,” the official end 
to the international slave trade in the United States and in violation of the Act Prohibiting the 
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Importation of Slaves of 1807.161 Further, Lorraine claimed that Bonlivar “holds Gomez in 
bondage under a claim denied originally from the importers of the said petitioner.” 
Gomez originally petitioned the First District Court of New Orleans with the assistance of 
petitioners like Edwin Lorraine, Jose Barbosa, Joaquim Fernandez, and Manuel Joaquim, and 
initially gained his freedom for a brief period from the New Orleans First District Court. However, 
his case underwent lengthy appeals processes from his illegal enslaver, Alexander Bonlivar, until 
it finally reached the Louisiana State Supreme Court in 1818.  
Despite the lower court's approval of Gomez's freedom suit, Justice Pierre Derbigny, the 
presiding judge over Gomez's case in the state supreme court, unfortunately overrode the district 
court's decision and altogether dismissed Gomez's suit. In his commenting opinion on the case, 
Justice Derbigny stated that, while Gomez may have been brought to the United States illegally 
and in violation of slave smuggling laws, “individuals thus imported attain no personal rights.162" 
He went on and stated that “the plaintiff cannot be listened to in a court of justice,” and essentially 
threw out Gomez's case. In his final remarks, Derbigny declared all illegally imported slaves into 
Louisiana as “mere passive beings.”  
Candido Gomez’s freedom suit and its outcome at the state supreme court serves as a useful 
lens through which to better understand how slaves actively and strategically navigated the law as 
a channel for resistance to slavery. Gomez and his witnesses connected the Atlantic World through 
their lived experiences in the international and illicit slave trades and presented their diverse 
worldviews on race and slavery from Brazil, the Caribbean, and the antebellum American South. 
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Black voices were central to Gomez’s freedom suit and forced legal officials to mitigate competing 
visions of slavery in the Atlantic World. Although the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided 
Gomez’s case by declaring all illegally imported slaves as “mere passive beings,” Gomez and his 
witnesses demonstrated the opposite. Indeed, free and enslaved blacks actively shaped the Atlantic 
World as they navigated the law as litigants, worked as sailors and shipmate, and served as 
witnesses whose testimonies illuminated the lived experiences of black society in the circum-
Caribbean.   
Further, Gomez's case, along with the other petitions in this section including John Lewis from 
British Jamaica and Catherine from French Saint-Domingue, reveal to a great degree the 
importance of witnesses and community members in legal claims-making. Their witnesses 
provided important comments on the petitioners' status as a free or enslaved individual, how they 
knew them, and if they agreed with their testimonies. Perhaps most importantly, though, their 
narratives revealed valuable details into the lived experiences and identities of the petitioners 
across the Atlantic and the networks they belonged to. In Gomez's case, we can see an intricate 
network of belonging among himself, free and enslaved Africans in Brazil, free sailors in the 
Caribbean involved in the African slave trade, and far-off networks of trade in Mozambique and 
El Mina. In John Kimbel's case, his witnesses revealed that Kimbel belonged to a network of free 
black sailors in the British Atlantic and perhaps even a military community as a potential deserter 
of a British man of war ship. Finally, Catherine's case presented a glimpse into her networks in 
New Orleans as a free and property-holding black woman displaced from Saint-Domingue. In her 
narrative, she recounted how on two occasions community members vouched for her freedom and 
"manifested in such a way" that she was able to hold onto her rights as a free woman. 
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Ultimately, these freedom petitions provide an important window into freedom-claiming 
narratives by petitioners and, moreover, narratives by communities in the Atlantic World. They 
revealed how witnesses attempted to articulate and make sense of litigants' sometimes ambiguous 
statuses and identities as free or enslaved individuals. Further, when viewing these cases together, 
a broad web of Atlantic narratives across the circum-Caribbean appears that reveals connections 
among the British, Iberian, and French empires. As petitioners and witnesses gave testimonies 
about their lived experiences for distinct corners of the Atlantic World, their narratives revealed a 
wide-ranging network of belonging across imperial colonies, oceans, and metropoles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
"A GREAT CONFUSION OF TONGUES:" ATLANTIC EMPIRES IN ANTEBELLUM 
FREEDOM-CLAIMING 
In 1822, the New Orleans Directory and Register was published and it contained “the 
names, professions, and residences of all heads of families and persons of business” in New 
Orleans. The register served as a directory and useful tool to navigate the city and names of people 
in the city were listed, along with their profession.163 For example, recall both Zephir and 
Catherine's freedom petitions in 1819. They both petitioned separately and with different stories 
about how they became illegally enslaved. Zephir presented the court with a narrative of military 
service and displacement from illegal enslavement and the Haitian Revolution. On the other hand, 
while Catherine was displaced as well due to the Haitian Revolution, it was as a free and property-
holding black woman who created strong community ties in New Orleans. Despite their 
differences, they both shared one thing in common: they were both illegally enslaved by Simon 
Gallien Preval who appeared in the Directory and Register. The directory listed Preval as a Justice 
of the Peace, a title that explains why he had access to the parish jail to imprison Catherine after 
each unsuccessful attempt to sell her. Further, it demonstrates the great risk that Zephir and 
Catherine both took in publicly suing a Justice of the Peace.164  
In addition to containing information about elite community members and their 
professions, the directory provided commentary about the city. In a section titled, “Notes on New 
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Orleans,” the author relayed information about changes in demographics developing in the city.165 
For example, he stated that “the population was much increased by the unfortunate French 
emigrants from St. Domingo [Saint-Domingue], and afterwards in 1809, by those who were 
compelled to flee from the island of Cuba, to the number of about 10,000.”  
The author also referenced the growing diversity in New Orleans and noted that “the 
population is much mixed, consisting of foreign and native French; Americans born in the state 
and from every state in the Union; a few Spaniards; and foreigners from almost every nation; and 
consequently, the society is much diversified.” The author stated, “there is no general fixed 
character and there is a great ‘confusion of tongues,’ and on the Levee, during a busy day, can be 
seen people of every grande, color, and condition.” To conclude, the author wrote, “in short, it is 
a world in miniature.” 
The author's comments in the New Orleans Directory and Register especially resonate with 
the freedom suits in this thesis. Litigants' freedom petitions and lived experiences across the 
Atlantic illustrate to a great degree the registry’s remark that New Orleans - as well as the rest of 
the antebellum US South and circum-Caribbean - was a “world in miniature.” Their petitions 
traced each of their journeys across the Atlantic World, sometimes reaching as far as Mozambique 
in Africa or Dundee in Scotland. They petitioned as savvy litigants and revealed insight into slaves 
and free blacks' experiences as skilled artisans, knowledgeable shipmates, and free black women 
as successful property-holders.  
While their narratives did not appear in the registry, their freedom petitions serve as a 
window into the lived experiences of afro-descended peoples in slavery, freedom, and the law 
across the Atlantic Caribbean. Perhaps most important, their petitions tell these stories through 
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their own voices, perspectives, and experiences. Indeed, the freedom petitions in this thesis and 
the narratives within them mirror the 1822 New Orleans directory statement that the city was "a 
world in miniature," only this time told through the voices and perspectives of afro-descended 
peoples seeking freedom in law. 
This thesis has explored freedom petitions initiated by slaves and free blacks from across 
the Atlantic World in the antebellum US South to reveal important similarities and comparisons 
across Iberian, French, British, and American jurisdictions. Ultimately, antebellum US legal 
officials primarily cared whether or not slaves could prove their free status in court and, to that 
end, petitioners made legal claims and strategies that asserted their freedom. They emphasized to 
courts that they were either born free, manumitted, or emancipated, and sometimes used freedom 
papers or community support to assist their claims. Slaves and free blacks also created narratives 
that reflected and represented themselves and their identities as free persons to support their 
claims. Common examples they used to reflect their experiences in freedom involved moving 
freely in the Atlantic, serving in the military, and working in skilled labor positions.  
Importantly, petitioners also articulated their identity as free persons through their Atlantic 
imperial connections. To petitioners, being a member of an empire and enjoying imperial 
subjecthood was connected to their identities as a free persons. This connection to empire and 
subjecthood in their claims raised important questions throughout this thesis. For example, what 
role did empire and subjecthood play in their narratives? How useful was it as a legal strategy for 
slaves and free blacks to present themselves as free? Did legal officials recognize or adjudicate 
freedom suits based on imperial connections? 
Overall, legal officials were mostly concerned with whether or not petitioners could prove 
their free status - not where they belonged in the Atlantic World. However, slaves and free blacks 
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continued to present themselves and articulate their identities as closely connected to Atlantic 
empires. Ultimately, their use of imperial connections served as another way to articulate their 
experiences and identities as free persons alongside assertions of free birth, emancipation, and 
manumission although it held few legal benefits in the US South.  
In addition to this thesis' examination of petitioners' legal narratives in court in connection 
to Atlantic empires and their identities within them, this study examined major trends in 
historiographical works, law and legal procedures in the Atlantic World, and historical 
transformations that gave a broad and interconnected context to the petitioners' lived experiences. 
Indeed, seemingly disparate experiences of slaves and free blacks across the Atlantic World in 
reality shared many commonalities, namely through their experiences at court where they 
presented strategic narratives to petition for their freedom. Litigants and their witnesses from 
Jamaica, Brazil, Saint-Domingue, Cuba, and more navigated the law in similar ways and this work 
contributed to a larger academic discourse that views the Americas on a shared stage. 
Also, petitioners strategically called upon witnesses to vouch for their claims and these 
witnesses and community members played a vital role in the legal process for freedom. Neighbors, 
friends and family, and more told legal officials anecdotes and opinions about the petitioners and 
grappled with how to articulate their identities and relationships. Although they were sometimes 
ambiguous, uncertain, or contradictory, witnesses revealed the social networks to which petitioners 
belonged and could access. In these petitions, networks of free black sailors, free property-holding 
women, imperial subjects, and more appeared and serve to tie together the Atlantic World in 
interconnected ways. 
Taken together, the petitions in this thesis exemplify the statement that New Orleans and, 
even more broadly the antebellum US South, was a "world in miniature." Ultimately, the 
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antebellum US South became a nexus where slaves and free blacks used the law to gain their 
liberty, craft narratives that reflected their freedom, and position their identities as free persons in 
close connection to Atlantic empires. Importantly, petitioners presented courts with narratives in 
which rights as free persons and as imperial subjects were intertwined. 
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